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FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
DOE PLEADING TO BE DISREGARDED 
IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: 
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO 
BRYANT v. FORD MOTOR CO. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 
In the fall of 1988 Congress enacted the Court Reform and 
Access to Justice Act of 1988.1 The purpose of the legislation 
was to "improve the administration of justice in this nation".2 
To stem the "torrent of litigation" in federal courts, the House 
of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Admistration of Justice proposed the elimination of federal 
diversity jurisdiction.3 Although this radical proposal was not 
adopted, various changes were made in the diversity and re-
moval statutes which will limit access to the federal courts.' 
1. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988. H.R. 4807. 100th Congr. 2d 
Sess. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Court Reform and Access to Justice 
Act of 1988). 
2. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess., Statement of Legislative History, at 23 (1988). The Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice said: 
[d. 
The subcommittee also learned that the Federal judiciary is 
beset by problems in all three of these areas: delay caused by 
rising caseloads and insufficient support services; spiraling 
costs caused by litigation expenses and attorneys' fees; and 
unfair and inconsistent decision caused by the pressures 
placed on judges who must cope with the torrent of litigation. 
3. [d. at 25, pt. III. 
4. One of the most important provisions of the new law affecting diversity jurisdic-
tion is to raise the jurisdictional amount in controversy from $10,000 to $50,000. It is 
estimated that this increase will reduce the federal diversity caseload by up to 40%. [d. 
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Congress, however, declined to follow the course taken by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1987 case, Bryant v. Ford 
Motor Co./' which had also tried to reduce the federal court 
workload. Bryant barred removal when ficitious defendants were 
named; Section 909 of the Act mandates that the citizenship of 
fictitious defendants be disregarded for removal purposes.s The 
problems presented by Bryant and the reasons for the Congres-
sional action are presented in this Comment. 
B. BRYANT V. FORD MOTOR CO. 
In Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
bane, upheld its general rule that the presence of Doe defend-
ants in pleadings destroys diversity and precludes removal.7 If 
plaintiff names a Doe defendant, the case must remain in state 
court. The court overruled all of its previous exceptions which 
allowed removal, acknowledging that they had led to "considera-
ble confusion".8 Under the "bright-line" rule Bryant said that 
district courts "will no longer have to make the near-impossible 
determination of when allegations against Doe defendants are 
'specific' enough to defeat diversity."B 
Going far beyond the problem presented in the case, the 
majority laid down its new rule with little discussion or analysis. 
The bulk of the opinion consisted of Judge Kozinski's dissent. lo 
He wrote that the new rule misinterpreted the Erie doctrine, 
and went against Congressional policy that removal be speedy 
and consistent nationwide.ll He also proposed the rule later en-
dorsed by Congress: treating Doe pleading as procedural and 
Doe defendants as nominal. 12 
5. 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Hall, J. en banc consideration; Norris, J. filed a 
concurring opinion; Kozinski, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which O'Scannlain, J. 
joined). 
6. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, at § 909(a) 
provides: 
"Actions Removable Generally.-Section 1441(a) is amended by adding at the end 
thereof the following new sentence: 'For purposes of removal under this chapter, the 
citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded." 
7. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 608. 
11. [d. at 610,617. 
12. [d. at 619. 
2
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II. FACTS OF BRYANT 
Gary Bryant, a resident of California, was injured while 
driving a Ford van for United Parcel Service. IS He sued Ford 
plus fifty Doe defendants14 for negligence, breach of warranty, 
and strict liability,lIl alleging that the passive restraint system in 
the van was defective because it did not include a shoulder 
harness. IS 
Ford removed the action to the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California based on diversity of citi-
zenship.17 Bryant did not object. IS A joint inspection of the van 
by Bryant and Ford fourteen months after the accident revealed 
that Ford had manufactured only the chassis of the van.19 The 
body and the passive restraint system were manufactured by 
other companies.20 Since Ford had routinely destroyed its 
records, the companies responsible could not be identified at the 
time of the inspection.21 
13. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1987). 
14. [d. at 603. "Doe" defendants are defendants sued under a fictitious name. Piain-
tiff uses a Doe designation when he is ignorant of defendant's true name, identity, con-
nection with the case, or liability. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
15. [d. 
16. [d. 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Actions removable generally 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Con-
gress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division 
embracing the place where such action is pending. 
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be re-
movable without regard to the citizenship. or residence of the 
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none 
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defend-
ants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
18. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. In California plaintiff has one year to file a complaint. See infra note 39 and 
accompanying text. By the time that Bryant and Ford held their joint inspection and 
discovered Ford's non-liability, it was too late for Bryant to discover the other manufac-
turers and file a separate action against them in state court. [d. 
3
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Ford moved for summary judgment.22 Bryant said that he 
planned to name the Doe defendants as soon as he discovered 
their identities.23 The district court took no action with respect 
to the Doe defendants, and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Ford.24 
Bryant then moved the court to add two California and one 
non-California corporations as defendants: City Ford Company, 
the seller of the van; Grumman-Olson, the producer of the body; 
and General Seating and Sash Company, the non-resident pro-
ducer of the seats.21i Bryant also moved to remand the case to 
state court.26 But the district court refused to relieve Bryant 
from the final judgment and denied Bryant's motion, on the 
ground that the presence of non-diverse parties was not new evi-
dence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).27 Bryant appealed.28 
A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that because 
the Doe defendants were real but unidentified, the district court 
could not determine whether they would defeat diversity juris-
diction.29 The panel remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to remand to state court.30 After a petition for re-
hearing was. filed, the Ninth Circuit panel requested en banc 
22. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. 
23.Id. 
24. Id. The district court granted summary judgment because it found no material 
facts supporting Ford's liability: Ford was not involved in production of the passive re-
straint system. Id. 
25.Id. 
26.Id. 
27. Id. The court found no excusable neglect for the delay in bringing the new de-
fendants before the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) provides, in the relevant part, as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discov-
ered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b). 
28. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. The Ninth Circuit granted a limited remand for the 
district court to reconsider its previous rulings. The district court again refused to join 
the new parties. Bryant appealed again. Id. 
29. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. 
30.Id. 
4
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consideration of the case.31 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. CALIFORNIA DOE DEFENDANT PRACTICE 
In California, plaintiffs who are ignorant of the name of the 
defendant may sue defendant under a fictitious name under Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code Section 474.32 The fictitious name used is usu-
ally John Doe and use of Section 474 is called Doe defendant 
practice.33 
Section 474, as interpreted by California courts, allows 
plaintiff to file a complaint using "Doe" when he is ignorant of 
31. Id. 
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979) reads: 
When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he 
must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the 
action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be 
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and 
when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding 
must be amended accordingly; provided, that no default or de-
fault judgment shall be entered against a defendant so desig-
nated, unless it appears that the copy of the summons or other 
process, or, if there be no summons or process, the copy of the 
first pleading or notice served upon such defendant bore on 
the face thereof a notice stating in substance: "To the person 
served: You are hereby served in the within action (or pro-
ceedings) as (or on behalf 00 the person sued under the ficti-
tious name of (designating it)." The certificate or affidavit of 
service must state the fictitious name under which such de-
fendant was served and the fact that notice of identity was 
given by endorsement upon the document served as required 
by this action. The foregoing requirements for entry of a de-
fault or default judgment shall be applicable only as to ficti-
tious names designated pursuant to this section and not in the 
event the plaintiff has sued the defendant by an erroneous 
name and shall not be applicable to entry of a default or de-
fault judgment based upon service, in the manner otherwise 
provided by law, of an amended pleading, process or notice 
designating defendant by his true name. 
33. Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Practice: A Fiction Stranger Than 
Truth, 30 STAN. L. REV. 51, 55 (1977) [hereinafter Hogan]. See also Note, Doe Defend-
ants and other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases, 35 STANFORD 
L. REV. 297, 300, n.14 (1983) (authored by Stephen Easton) [hereinafter Note, Doe De-
fendants] (Describes conflicts between state Doe defendant practice and federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. Easton notes that thirty states have adopted statutes or procedural 
rules with similar provisions.) 
5
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defendant's real name,S4 involvement,SII or liability.s6 It is also 
proper to list Does in the complaint as a safeguard only, in case 
new defendants are discovered later.s7 In these cases plaintiff is 
using Doe pleading to add a new defendant. S6 
34. Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 196, 64 P. 264, 265 (1901). Plaintiff substituted 
a real defendant for a Doe shortly after the expiration of the statute of limitations; the 
substitution was upheld: "[Tlhere is nothing to show that the plaintiff knew the true 
name of the fictitious defendant sued; nor can the objection that he might have learned 
by searching the records be entertained". [d. at 197, 64 P. at 265. 
35. Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 782, 785-86, 132 Cal. Rptr. 
631,633-34 (1st Dist. 1976). Plaintiff Wallis was injured by a railroad boxcar. [d. at 785, 
132 Cal. Rptr. at 633. He filed a complaint naming only Doe One through Doe Twenty. 
Before the expiration of the statute of limitations he served Southern Pacific Transpor-
tation Company as Doe One. [d. Defendant moved to strike the complaint on the ground 
that plaintiff could have discovered the true identity before filing the complaint. The 
court held that whether plaintiff knew defendant's identity at the time he began the 
action is not controlling. [d. at 786, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 633. A plaintiff may be ignorant of 
defendant's name if he knows the defendant's identity, but is ignorant of the facts giving 
him a cause of action against him. "The question is whether he knew or reasonably 
should have known that he had a cause of action against respondent." [d. at 786, 132 
Cal. Rptr. at 634. The burden is on defendant to show plaintiff knew or should have 
known whom his cause of action was against. [d. See also Day v. Western Loan & Bldg. 
Co., 42 Cal. App. 2d 226, 236, 108 P.2d 702, 707 (1st Dist. 1940) (if plaintiff unaware that 
any relation of respondeat superior existed at time of filing complaint, employer's name 
can later be substituted for Doe). 
36. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137-38, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 650, 653 (2d Dist. 1963) (although plaintiff knew defendants' names, he was igno-
rant that he might have a cause of action against them; use of Doe practice allowed him 
to bring in defendants past the statute of limitations). 
37. Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 56 Cal. 2d 596, 602, 364 P.2d 
681,684,15 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (1961). Plaintiff Austin originally sued a brokerage house, 
Pacific States Security Corp., plus Does for refusal to deliver property as a principal; 
then amended the complaint to substitute Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., as 
surety on the bond. [d. at 598-99, 364 P.2d at 682, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 818. This was a 
different cause of action, but related to the same defalcation, and the court allowed the 
amendment to relate back, even though the statute of limitations would have barred an 
independent suit against the new defendant. [d. at 602, 364 P.2d at 684, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 
820. The court stated "A defendant unaware of the suit against him by a fictitious name 
is in no worse position if, in addition to substituting his true name, the amendment 
makes other changes in the allegations on the basis of the same general set of facts" [d. 
at 602, 364 P.2d. at 684, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 820. See Hogan, supra note 33, at 67. Hogan 
states: 
[d. 
While such a party's position may be 'no worse,' the real ques-
tion is why his position should be bad at all. An independent 
suit against him would be vulnerable to the defense of limita-
tions. Absent the fictitious defendant allegations, any attempt 
to add him as a defendant to the pending suit would encoun-
ter the same bar. 
38. Note, Doe Defendants, supra note 33, at 302. 
6
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California has an unusually short one year statute of limita-
tions for tort claims.39 The utility of Doe defendant practice is 
enhanced by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 350 which tolls the 
statute of limitations against unnamed or unknown Doe defend-
ants the moment the complaint is filed, rather than when de-
fendant is served.40 This means that a plaintiff who is not sure 
of whom to sue can keep the door open to join additional de-
fendants by filing a complaint naming Does. Taken together the 
two statutes allow the plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations 
by filing a Doe complaint, and the subsequently identified de-
fendant is a party to the cause of action from the date of filing.41 
Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 583.210, plaintiff 
has three years from the date the complaint is filed to serve 
the defendants.42 So by filing against Doe defendants plaintiff 
may potentially" 3 extend the statute of limitations to four 
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) mandates that actions for 
personal injury, wrongful death, torts, statutory penalties, check payment by bank, prop-
erty seizure and good faith improvements be filed within one year. Only four other states 
have a one year limit: Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennesee. See Hogan, supra 
note 33, at 94. 
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 350 (West 1982) reads: "An action is commenced, within 
the meaning of this Title, when the complaint is filed." 
41. Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 196, 64 P. 264 265 (1901). Plaintiff sued a 
named defendant plus Does to foreclose a mortgage. When he substituted a grantee of 
the mortgagor for a Doe, the grantee objected to the action as time-barred, but the court 
ruled he was a party to the action from its commencement. [d. at 197, 64 P. at 265. 
42. At the time Bryant began his action in California state court, the relevant stat-
ute was CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE Section 581a(a), 1982 Cal. Stat. 2574-75 (repealed 1984) 
which read: 
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced by complaint 
shall be further prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall 
be had therein, and all actions heretofore or hereafter com-
menced shall be dismissed by the court in which the action 
shall have been commenced, on its own motion, or on the mo-
tion of any party interested therein, whether named as a party 
or not, unless the summons on the complaint is served and 
return made within three years after the commencement of 
the action, except where the parties have filed a stipulation in 
writing that the time may be extended or the party against 
whom the action is prosecuted has made a general apperance 
in the action. 
The current CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 582.210 (West 1988) is substantially similar. 
43. The three year period is not an absolute right but within the discretion of the 
trial court. Kreiss v. Hotaling, 99 Cal. 383, 384-86, 33 P. 1125, 1125-26 (1893). In Kreiss 
plaintiff and defendant were engaged in arbitration. During this period plaintiff filed the 
complaint in order to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations, but failed to serve 
7
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years."" "Nearly every civil case now filed in California contains 
Doe allegations. The reason is simple: It would be malpractice 
for a lawyer to omit such allegations if there is even the remotest 
chance that other defendants might turn up."411 
B. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction."8 In or-
der to avoid local prejudice, Article III, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution allows plaintiff to file suit in federal court if 
defendant is a citizen of a different state. The current federal 
statute"7 provides that plaintiff may file in federal court where 
he is of diverse citizenship from the defendant, and the amount 
defendant for two years. [d. at 384,33 P. at 1125. The court used its discretionary power 
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for inexcusable delay. [d. at 386, 33 P. at 1126. See also, 
Hogan, supra note 33, at 87 which suggests three factors to be considered: (1) how dili-
gent plaintiff was in finding Does; (2) how promptly did plaintiff serve Does; and (3) how 
much prejudice would the new defendants suffer. 
44. Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp. 294, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See 
discussion infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text. 
45. Bryant, 844 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J. dissenting). His assump-
tion as to numbers of cases alleging Does is disputed by the majority. [d. at 606, n.6. See 
R. WElL & I. BROWN, CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 6:58.1 at 6-
10 (1985). Reasons to name Does include: (1) plaintiff does not know the true names of 
tortfeasors; (2)plaintiff knows the names of tortfeasors, but suspects others were in-
volved; and (3) plantiff does not know all the facts and is therefore ignorant of defend-
ants' liability. Naming Does is good practice because it "keeps the door open". However, 
the practice is proper only if plaintiff is genuinely ignorant of defendants' true names or 
the facts giving rise to liability. 
46. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that federal jurisdiction shall extend to specifi-
cally enumerated controversies only, including cases arising under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States (federal question jurisdiction); and controversies between 
states, or citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction). 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982): provides: 
Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil action where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between-
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state; 
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and 
(4) a foreign state, • • • as plaintiff and citizens of a State 
or of different States. 
THE COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, see supra note 4, at § 311 
raised the amount in controversy to $50,000. 
8
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in controversy is greater than $50,000. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 extended the choice of forum to 
defendant who may remove an action to federal court that plain-
tiff originally filed in state court.'s Removal jurisidiction is nar-
. rowly construed.'9 The requirements for defendant to remove a 
diversity case are even stricter than for plaintiff to originally file 
in federal court: an action begun in state court may be removed 
to federal court only if there is complete diversity of citizenship 
and no defendant is a resident of the forum state. ISO Defendant 
48. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104-05, (1941) considered the mean-
ing of the federal removal statute. Removal is statutory, pursuant to Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789), which has a constitutional dimension under 
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. The Shamrock court quoted from Sec-
tion 28 of the Judicial Code then in effect: 
'And where a suit is brought in any State court, in which there 
is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the 
suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any defendant, 
being such citizen of another State, may remove such suit into 
the district court of the United States for the proper district, 
at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to 
appear to said district court that from prejudice or local influ-
ence he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, 
or in any other State court to which the said defendant may, 
under the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such 
prejudice or local influence, to remove such cause. . . .' 
49. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201 (1877). In a suit concern-
ing right of ways granted by Congress the Court said: 
It is well settled that in the courts of the United States 
the special facts necessary for jurisdiction must in some form 
appear in the record of every suit, and that the right of re-
moval from the State courts to the United States courts is 
statutory. A suit commenced in a State court must remain 
there until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its 
tranfer. The record in the State court, which includes the peti-
tion for removal, should be in such condition when the re-
moval takes place as to show jurisdiction in the court to which 
it goes. If it is not, and the omission is not afterwards sup-
plied, the suit must be remanded. 
[d. at 201. See also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3721, at 185 (2d ed. 1985) [herinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER] (the right of 
removal from state court to federal court is purely statutory.) 
50. It is stricter because plaintiff could have originally filed in federal court in de-
fendant's home state. But if plaintiff files in state court in defendant's home state, de-
fendant cannot remove because he is a citizen of the forum state, and presumably would 
not suffer local prejudice in his own state court. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, § 3723 at 
308-10 (2d ed. 1985). 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides: 
Actions removable generally 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original 
9
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has thirty days from the receipt of the state court pleading to 
remove:H After removal, if the federal court determines that di-
versity jurisdiction does not exist, it must remand to state court, 
and the order for remand is ordinarily not reviewable.1I2 
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Con-
stitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be remov-
able without regard to the citizenship or residence of the par-
ties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of 
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defend-
ants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (ruled that there is no diversity 
jurisdiction if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant); Owen Equip. 
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (upheld requirement of complete 
diversity between plaintiffs and defendants). 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982) provides: 
Procedure for removal 
The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding 
shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the de-
fendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such ac-
tion or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the ser-
vice of the summons upon the defendant if such initial plead-
ing has then been filed in court and is not required to be 
served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 
COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, § 909(b)(2)(B), see supra note 1 and 
accompanying text, provides: 
Section 1446 is amended-
in the second paragraph by striking out the period at the 
end thereof and inserting in lieu therof ", except that a case 
may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by 
section 1332 of this title more than one year after commence-
ment of the action. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) provides: 
Procedure after removal generally 
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 
case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the 
district court shall remand the case, and may order the pay-
ment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand 
shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The 
State court may thereupon proceed with such case. 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982) provides: 
An order remanding a case to the State court from which 
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, ex-
cept that an order remanding a case to the State court from 
which it was removed pursuant to section 1443, of this title 
[28 U.S.C. § 1443] (civil rights cases) shall be reviewable by 
appeal or otherwise. 
COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, § 909, (c) (1), see supra note 1, 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) as follows: 
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in 
removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the fil-
10
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When plaintiff files suit against several defendants, some of 
whom are citizens of the same state as himself, the action must, 
of course, be filed in state court. But if plaintiff later drops the 
suit against the resident defendants, the non-resident defendant 
may then have thirty days to remove.Ci3 It is "the intention of 
Congress that the petition for removal should be filed at the ear-
liest possible opportunity. But, so long as there does not appear 
of record to be any removable controversy, no party can be enti-
tled to remove it."Ci( Since the federal courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, the presumption is that there is no jurisdiction 
unless it is affirmatively shown.1iIi The United States Supreme 
Court has concluded that federal removal law should be consis-
tent nationwide.Ci8 
ing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any 
time before final judgment it appears that the district court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 
A new subsection (e) was added which provides: 
If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional de-
fendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and re-
mand the action to the State court. 
See also Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1975). The District 
Court remanded a diversity case because its docket was overcrowded. Id. at 336. Because 
this is not one of the statutory reasons to remand, the Court held the order was review-
able. Id. at 352. The Court stated, however, "[I]n order to prevent delay in the trial of 
remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues, Congress immunized 
from all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds specified in 
Section 1447(c), whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate 
court." (citation omitted). Id. at 35l. 
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
54. Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 100 (1898). In Powers plaintiff sued 
a railroad and railroad employees for negligence in state court. Id. at 96. Defendant re'-
moved, plaintiff remanded, and plaintiff then dropped his action against the non-diverse 
defendants. Id. at 98. The court held that the case then became removable: "the exis-
tence of diverse citizenship, or other equivalent condition of jurisdiction is fundamental; 
the want of it will be taken notice of by the court of its own motion, and cannot be 
waived by either party. But the time of filing for removal is not essential to the jurisdic-
tion". Id. Removal is timely when the action first becomes removable (diverse). Id. at 
10l. 
55. Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883): This was an action 
on a fire insurance policy. Id. at 281-82. The Supreme Court raised the question of juris-
diction sua sponte. Id. at 283. "As the jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited, in the 
sense that it has no other jurisdiction than that conferred by the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction unless 
the contrary affirmatively appears." Id. at 283. 
56. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1940). In Shamrock plaintiff 
sued defendant in state court, defendant cross-claimed and plaintiff sought to remove. 
Id. at 103. The Court held that the case turned on statutory construction of the federal 
removal statute which was intended to be nationally consistent. Id. at 104. 
11
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C. VOLUNTARy-INVOLUNTARY RULE 
Since removal jurisdiction is strictly construed, in order for 
defendant to remove to federal court, federal jurisdiction usually 
must exist both when the action is filed in state court and when 
the removal petition is filed:i7 But if plaintiff initiates an action 
against both resident and non-resident defendants, and then 
voluntarily dismisses his complaint against the resident, diver-
sity of citizenship then exists for the first time and the non-resi-
dent defendant may then remove. liS Thus the voluntary-involun-
tary rule mandates that a suit remain in state court unless a 
"voluntary" act of the plaintiff brings about a change which al-
lows federal jurisdiction to be asserted. liD It means that any 
pleadings by defendant,60 or judgment of any issue on the merits 
are insufficient to create federal jurisdiction;61 only plaintiff's 
voluntary amendment of his pleadings, or voluntary dismissal of 
57. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3723 at 312-14 (2d ed. 1984). The 
purpose of requiring diversity at both times is to prevent defendant from moving to a 
new state and then removing on the basis of his new citizenship. 
58. Powers, 169 U.S. at 97-98 (1898). This was what happened in Powers when the 
railway removed after plaintiff dropped his suit against the resident employees. [d. at 98. 
If defendant was prevented from removing at this stage, because there was no diversity 
at the time the suit was filed, plaintiff could block defendant's statutory right of removal 
merely by naming non-diverse defendants and then later dropping them. See WRIGHT, 
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3723 at 312-14 (2d ed. 1984). 
59. See Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 657-59 (9th Cir. 1978) for a 
concise history of the voluntary-involuntary rule. There plaintiff filed against GM and a 
resident defendant, who not only received a final judgment from state court, but had 
signed a covenant with plaintiff not to execute judgment against him. [d. at 656. GM 
removed to federal court after the elimination of the non-diverse defendant, but the case 
was remanded for violation of the voluntary-involuntary rule as plaintiff had neither dis-
missed nor discontinued the case against the resident defendant. [d. at 660. 
60. Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918). Plaintiff's wrongful 
death action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) which does 
not allow removal. [d. at 280. Defendant showed that FE LA did not apply, and peti-
tioned for removal. [d. at 281. The Court held that no pleadings by the defendant could 
make a case removable: 
[d. 
It is also settled that a case, arising under the laws of the 
United States, non-removable on the complaint, when com-
menced, cannot be converted into a removable one by evi-
dence of the defendant or by an order of the court upon any 
issue tried upon the merits, but that such conversion can only 
be accomplished by the voluntary amendment of his pleading 
by the plaintiff or, where the case is not removable because of 
joinder of defendants, by the voluntary dismissal or nonsuit 
by him of a party or of parties defendant. 
61. Self, 588 F.2d at 659. 
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a party can trigger removal. 
The voluntary-involuntary rules stems from the idea that 
the cause of action, and therefore jurisdiction, is to be deter-
mined from plaintiff's pleadings.62 The rationale of the volun-
tary-involuntary rule is judicial efficiency and finality.63 It is effi-
cient because to allow the non-resident defendant to remove 
after a summary judgment of the resident defendant in state 
court would cause plaintiff to repeat his case in federal court. It 
is final because when plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a defendant 
he is gone for good. But an involuntary dismissal of a defendant 
may be overturned by plaintiff's appeal. If removal were al-
lowed, and then the resident defendant was re-joined, the fed-
eral court would lose jurisdiction.S. However, the voluntary-in-
voluntary rule is formally invoked even where the state court 
decision was final. 611 
62. The rule applies to both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. See Powers 
v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898). The Powers Court said, quoting Pirie v. 
Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, 43 (1884) 
[d. at 97. 
A defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several 
which the plaintiff seeks to make joint. A separate defense 
may defeat a joint recovery, but it cannot deprive Ii plaintiff of 
his right to prosecute his suit to final decision in his own way. 
The cause of action is the subject-matter of the controversy, 
and that is, for all the purposes of the suit, whatever the 
plaintiff declares it to be in his pleadings. 
Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939) was a suit in which plaintiff sued railway plus 
named defendant passenger, plus railway employees plus Does for negligence. [d. at 536. 
The railway company insisted that the controversy as to it was a separable one and 
sought to remove. [d. at 536. The Pullman court ruled: "[T)he right to remove ... was to 
be determined according to the plaintiff's pleading at the time of the petition for re-
moval." [d. at 537. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) 
the plaintiff was not allowed to invoke federal question jurisdiction by anticipating a 
federal defense which might be asserted by the defendant. Nor could defendant's plead-
ings have any bearing on jurisdiction; it must be established by plaintiff's pleadings or 
not at all. [d. 
63. See Self, 588 F.2d at 660-62 (Ely, J. dissenting), for a discussion of the rationale 
of the voluntary-involuntary rule. 
64. [d. at 661. 
65. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S. 
246 (1909). Plaintiff sued a resident defendant railroad company who was involuntarily 
dismissed; the dismissal was affirmed by the state supreme court. [d. at 246-47, 250. The 
other defendant, a nonresident construction company removed to federal court. [d. at 
248. The Supreme Court upheld plaintiff's remand, even though dismissal of the resident 
was final. [d. at 251. 
13
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D. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE DOE PLEADING RULES AND FED-
ERAL DIVERSITY RULES 
1. Doe Pleading in the Federal Courts 
Use of fictitious names is not mentioned in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) states that the 
complaint "shall include the names of all the parties". There is, 
however, no statute or rule forbidding the use of Doe plead-
ings.66 Where plaintiff files suit in federal court naming Doe de-
fendants, modern courts have tended to disallow the use of 
Does.67 Early cases, however, ignored Does for diversity pur-
66. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3642 at 146 (2d ed.1985). See also 
Craig v. U.S., 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 987 (1969). In Craig a 
widow filed a negligence action in admiralty against the United States plus other named 
defendants plus "Does I through X" for the death of her husband on the high seas. [d. at 
855. She later sought to amend the complaint to substitute another named defendant for 
Doe I. [d. at 855. Although the court said "There is no ,provision in the federal statutes 
or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure either authorizing or expressly prohibiting the use of 
fictitious parties", it disallowed the substitution. [d. at 856. 
The plaintiff, however, cannot sue as a Doe. FED. R. CIV, P. 17(a) says "Every action 
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." The Advisory Committee 
Notes to the 1966 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 17 commented: 
Modern decisions are inclined to be lenient when an honest 
mistake has been made in choosing the party in whose name 
the action is to be filed· • •. The provision should not be mis-
understood or distorted. It is intended to prevent forfeiture 
when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or 
when an understandable mistake has been made. It does not 
mean, for example, that, following an airplane crash in which 
all aboard were killed, an action may be filed in the name of 
John Doe (a fictitious person), as personal representative of 
Richard Roe (another fictitious person), in the hope that at a 
later time the attorney filing the action may substitute the 
real name of the real personal representative of a real victim, 
and have the benefit of suspension of the limitation period. It 
does not even mean, when an action is filed by the personal 
representative of John Smith, of Buffalo, in the good faith be-
lief that he was aboard the flight, that upon discovery that 
Smith is alive and well, having missed the fatal flight, the rep-
resentative of James Brown, of San Francisco, an actual vic-
tim, can be substituted to take advantage of the suspension of 
the limitation period. It is, in cases of this sort, intended to 
insure against forfeiture and injustice. 
67. See Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970). 
Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against named defendants plus Does in federal court 
based on diversity jurisdiction. [d. at 1188. The court stated "In the federal courts 'John 
Doe' casts no magical spell on a complaint otherwise lacking in diversity jurisdiction. 
There is no provision in the Federal Statutes or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for use 
of fictitious parties." [d. at 1191. If identity of Doe defendants was known so that plain-
14
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poses, considering them to be nominal parties only.68 Grigg v. 
Southern Pacific Co. 69 eloquently stated: 
Perhaps these Does have some proper place under 
California state practice. But it is hard to believe 
they serve any purpose when they are included 
superstitiously and without reason. Certainly 
their phantoms, when Does live not and are ac-
cused of nothing, should not divert the course of 
justice.70 
On the other hand, defendant seeking removal must show 
complete diversity and this fact must be apparent from the rec-
ord at the time of removal.71 This requirement is antithetical to 
Doe pleading. In Molnar v. National Broadcasting Company,72 
tiff could state that none of them were state residents, plaintiff could have stated their 
names in the complaint, and if plaintiff did not know their identities, then allegations of 
non-residency were mere guesswork Id.; Craig 413 F.2d at 856, [quoting Sigurdson v. Del 
Guercio, 241 F.2d 480, at 482 (9th Cir. 1956»): ("These John Doe complaints are danger-
ous at any time. It is inviting disaster to allow them to be filed and to allow fictitious 
persons to remain defendants if the complaint is still of record.") Applegate v. Top Asso-
ciates, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 51 (D.C.N.Y. 1969) (Does not permitted); Hall v. Pacific Mari-
time Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.C. Cal. 1968) (Does not permitted); But ct. Hughes 
Constr. Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 487 F. Supp. 345, 348 (D.C. Miss. 1980) (mere fa"t that 
plaintiff alleged ficitious defendants to be residents without identifying them or making 
specific allegations did not destroy diversity for removal purposes). 
68. Loop v. Winters' Estate, 115 F. 362 (C.C.D. Nev. 1902). In Loop plaintiff sued 
"Doe, Roe, Denn and Fenn" in Nevada state court and the named defendants removed 
to federal court alleging diversity. Id. at 362-63. The fictitious defendants were held to be 
merely formal parties who could not affect removal. Id. at 366.; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 F. 
81 (C.C.D. Nev. 1900). Plaintiff sued "John Doe" and "Richard Roe", citizenship un-
known. Id. at 82. The court disallowed removal, saying: "It is the duty of the court to 
consider only the citizenship and residence of the parties whose real names are disclosed 
in the pleadings. (citation omitted) 'The joinder of mere nominal or formal parties can 
no more secure the right of removal than their presence on the record defeat it' " Id.; 
Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Series Directors of Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 217 
F.2d 1, 6, cert. denied 349 U.S. 911 (1954) (there is nothing in the record to show the 
existence of such "juristic" person or persons). 
69. 246 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1957), reh'g denied 248 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1957). 
70. Id. at 620. In Grigg plaintiff was injured when his car struck a mule on a free-
way. Id. at 614. He brought an action for negligence in California state court ~gainst the 
owner of the mule, the railroad which had delivered the mule to a corral near the free-
way, and six Does. Id. at 615. Before trial, plaintiff dismissed the mule's owner (who had 
disappeared), and the railroad removed the action to federal court over plaintiff's objec-
tions. Id. at 616. The court held that the Does could be disregarded for diversity pur-
poses. Id. at 620. 
71. See supra, note 62 and accompanying text. 
72. 231 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1956). Plaintiff, a California citizen, fell on defendant's 
stairs. Id. at 685. She named as defendant a citizen of Delaware, and Does I-X. Id. She 
filed in federal court on the basis of diversity, alleging the Does were also Delaware citi-
15
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a pre-Bryant Ninth Circuit decision, plaintiff filed in federal 
court against the named defendant and Does I-X, alleging com-
plete diversity. The court held that the record did not disclose 
federal jurisdiction: "Allegations founding jurisdiction of a fed-
eral court must be precise. "78 
The basic problem in diversity jurisdiction is to decide 
whether Doe defendants are real parties whose diverse citizen-
ship must be shown, or nominal parties whose citizenship can be 
disregarded.74 
The Supreme Court has ruled on only one case dealing with 
Doe pleading and removal jurisdiction, Pullman Co. v. Jen-
kins.n There plaintiff's complaint made clear that the Doe de-
fendant was a real, not a nominal party.76 The Court held that 
zens. [d. The court said, however: 
If the identity of defendants were known so that the pleader 
could state they were citizens of Delaware, she could also state 
their names and allege what part each had in the management 
and control of the stairway. But, if the allegation that they are 
citizens of Delaware be, as on the face of the complaint it is, 
unfounded guesswork, the jurisdiction of the court is not 
established. 
[d. at 686-87. 
73. Molnar, 231 F.2d at 687. The Molnar court found plaintiff's allegations that Doe 
defendants were citizens of Delaware to be "unfounded guesswork". [d. "Such allegations 
might be used in terrorem to give validity to a suit which had no foundation." [d. The 
court went on to clarify its view of Doe pleading under federal jurisdiction: 
[d. at 687. 
This attempt to join fictitious defendants is said to be justified 
in California practice. However that may be, no one of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure under which federal courts operate 
gives warrant for the use of such a device. While the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are not universally inclusive of all 
possible colorings of practice, no justification can be found 
therein for a violation of jurisdictional principles. The meth-
ods used by the common law to extend jurisdiction of particu-
lar courts cannot be tolerated under the federal Constitution. 
The national trial courts are of special jurisdiction. At the out-
set of every proceeding there, jurisdiction should be estab-
lished by allegation of essential facts. 
74. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). Salem Trust 
was a suit between citizens of different states to determine which of them was entitled to 
a fund. [d. at 183. The citizenship of the fund's trustee was disregarded. [d. at 185. The 
court stated: "It is well settled that the citizenship of a merely nominal party is immate-
rial upon the question of removability on the ground of diverse citizenship." [d. 
75. 75. 305 U.S. 534 (1939). See Pullman, supra note 62 for details of the case. 
76. [d. at 536. 
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in order to remove the case to federal court the non-resident de-
fendant must prove either that the Doe defendant has diverse 
citizenship,77 or that the Doe has not been joined in good faith.78 
The Court did not address the situation of nominal Does. 
At the time Bryant was decided, the general rule in the 
Ninth Circuit was that the naming of Doe defendants in the 
pleadings defeats diversity jurisdiction; therefore district courts 
should remand cases containing allegations against Doe defend-
ants to state court.79 Before remand, however, the court must 
look beyond the pleadings to see if the Doe defendant actually 
existed and had a connection to the cause of action.80 Removal 
where Does were named was permitted if the pleadings satisfied 
one of five exceptions:81 (1) defendant proves that the Doe de-
fendants are wholly fictitious;82 (2) the complaint contains no 
charging allegations against the Doe defendants;83 (3) plaintiff 
abandons his claims against Doe defendants;84 (4) the complaint 
77. [d. at 540. 
78. [d. at 541. 
79. Bryant, 844 F.2d 602, 605. 
80. Scurlock v. American President Lines, Ltd., 162 F. Supp. 78 (C.D. Cal. 1958). 
Plaintiff sued defendant shipowner for negligence and filed in state court. [d. at 79. De-
fendant removed to the admiralty docket of the federal court, and plaintiff moved to 
transfer to the civil docket of the federal court. [d. at 79. The court said: 
[d. at 81. 
It appears that it is the obligation of the Court to ascertain 
whether or not the defendants Doe are nominal and disinter-
ested parties before a proper determination may be made as to 
whether or not the court has jurisdiction .... Looking at the 
record before the Court, it is obvious that the defendants Doe 
named in the complaint are unidentifiable, indefinite and 
ineffectual. 
The court disregarded the Does, saying "It is the duty of the Court, when determin-
ing the question of jurisdiction, to look beyond the pleadings. [d. at 80. 
81. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605. 
82. Grigg, 246 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1957). See supra note 70 for summary of facts. 
83. Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Plaintiff sued an insurance company and ten Does for a declaration of his rights under a 
disability insurance contract, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. [d. at 
1328-29. The insurance company removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. [d. at 
1329. The court held that the presence of the Doe defendants did not destroy diversity 
as plaintiff's complaint contained no charging allegations against them. [d. at 1330. 
84. Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900, 905 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 
676 (1942). Plaintiff filed an action in state court against railway and Does for negligence 
in causing a collision between a train and a car in which plaintiff was riding. [d. at 902. 
He failed to serve process upon the Does, and on the date the case was called for trial 
announced that he was ready to proceed. [d. Railway then filed a petition for removal 
which plaintiff opposed. [d. at 902-03. The next day plaintiff named and served one of 
17
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does not identify the Doe defendants with enough specificity;811 
or (5) the Doe defendants are not indispensable parties.8s Under 
Pullman removal is allowed if Does are fraudulently joined.87 
2. Other Conflicts between State and Federal Rules Affecting 
the Doe Practice in Federal Courts 
a. Service of Process 
Once the federal court agrees to hear a diversity case, new 
conflicts arise between state and federal law which affect Doe 
pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 40) provides that plaintiff must serve 
defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, or 
the action will be dismissed.88 As we have seen, California law 
allows plaintiff three years to serve defendants, including Doe 
defendants.89 
the defendants who had been designated as a Doe. [d. at 903. The court held that plain-
tiff had voluntarily abandoned his claim against the Doe defendants by announcing him-
self ready for trial. and allowed removal. [d. at 904. Note that this is consistent with the 
voluntary-involuntary rule. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
85. Hartwell Corp. v. Boeing Co., 678 F.2d 842. 843 (9th Cir. 1982). Hartwell filed 
suit in state court against Boeing and 20 Does for unfair competition. [d. at 842. Hart-
well alleged that Boeing had wrongfully disclosed its trade secrets. and the Does had in 
some unspecified manner participated in the wrongful actions. [d. The court found no 
basis in the complaint for finding that the Does were "mere phantoms" and allowed 
Boeing to remove. [d. at 843-44. 
86. Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458. 1463 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs sued 
their insurance company plus Does in state court. [d. at 1461. The insurance company 
removed. and the district court raised the jurisdiction question sua sponte because of the 
presence of Does. [d. The court ruled that it could dismiss non-diverse parties if they 
were not indispensable. [d. at 1463. Since plaintiffs were unaware of any actual Doe de-
fendants. and had no objection to dismissal of the Does. removal was upheld. [d. 
87. Pullman. 305 U.S. at 541: "It is always open to the non-resident defendant to 
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good faith and for that reason 
should not be considered in determining the right to remove." [d. 
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j) provides: 
Summons: Time limit for Service. 
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made 
upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the com-
plaint and the party on whose behalf such service was re-
quired cannot show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period. the action shall be dismissed as to that de-
fendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with 
notice to such party or upon motion. 
89. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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b. Joinder and Relation Back 
The federal rules are comprehensive and exacting concern-
ing the joinder of new parties. The court may require the joinder 
of necessary and indispensable parties,90 and may allow the join-
der of parties whose claims arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence.91 The court may add or drop parties at any stage of 
the action as justice requires.92 California Doe pleading practice 
is also very liberal regarding the joinder of new parties.93 
The conflict between federal and California laws arises if 
plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add a new defendant 
after the statute of limitations has expired.94 Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(c) allows amendments arising out of the same conduct, trans-
action or occurrence to relate back only if defendant (1) has re-
ceived notice of the action and (2) knew or should have known 
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) provides: 
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be 
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and 
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall 
order that he be made a party. 
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 provides: 
Permissive Joinder of Parties 
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons ... may be joined in 
one action as defendants if there is asserted against them 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in 
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of 
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 
92 .. FED. R. CIV. P. 21 provides: 
Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an ac-
tion. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court 
on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of 
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a 
party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474, see supra note 32 for text. 
94. Bryant sought to substitute the named defendants for Doe defendants more 
than one year after his accident. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 603-04. 
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that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against him.911 The 
Supreme Court has construed the notice requirement strictly.96 
Under California Doe pleading law, however, notice is not re-
quired.97 A Doe defendant who has not been served may have no 
notice that he is involved in the lawsuit. Amendments substitut-
ing a named defendant for a Doe relate back for the purpose of 
the statute of limitations.9B Whether the state or federal rule ap-
plies is critical for the parties when the statute of limitations has 
expired. 
E. DOE PLEADING AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE 
The Erie99 doctrine mandates that federal courts follow the 
substantive law of the forum state, but may use the Federal 
Rules for procedural matters.lOO The question then becomes, 
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) provides: 
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or 
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment 
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates 
back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the pe· 
riod provided by law for commencing the action against the 
party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1) has re-
ceived such notice of the institution of the action that the 
party will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the 
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action 
would have been brought against the party. 
96. In Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2085 (1986) plaintiff filed for libel 
against a magazine publisher. Id. at 2080. The magazine was Time, but plaintiff named 
Fortune, a division of Time. Id. Plaintiff sought to amend the pleading after the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations. Id. Although Time, as a related entity, probably had 
notice of the action, the court construed the notice requirement of Federal Rule 15(c) 
strictly: "The linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations period. Of course, 
there is an element of arbitrariness here, but that is characteristic of any limitations 
period. And it is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial pro-
cess." Id. at 2385. 
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474, text quoted supra at note 32, does not mention 
notice. 
98. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137-39, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 650, 653 (2d Dist. 1963) (plaintiff's use of Doe practice allowed him to bring in 
defendants after the expiration of the statute of limitations). 
99. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
100. Id. at 78. The liability of a railroad company for an accident occurring on a 
path on its right-of way depends on the law of the state where the accident occurred. Id. 
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what is substantive, what is procedural? Doe pleading is in-
cluded in the California Code of Civil Procedure, but has sub-
stantive ramifications which include tolling of the statute of lim-
itations and relation back.lol 
In Guaranty Trust v. York l02 the Supreme Court held that 
the length of a state statute of limitations was substantive. lOS In 
Ragan v. Merchants' Transfer & Warehouse CO.I04 the Court 
ruled that a state rule providing the statute of limitations is 
tolled by service of process on defendant was also substantive. 1011 
Hanna v. Plumerl06 seemed to undercut the scope of York and 
Ragan. Pointing out that the Erie doctrine has never been used 
to invalidate a Federal Rule, Hanna upheld the federal rule 
against a contrary state provision concerning the service of pro-
cess. l07 It mandated that the Rules Enabling Act controls the 
at 69, 78. The Court ruled: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state .... Congress 
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state." Id. at 78. 
101. See supra notes 32-44, 95-98 and accompanying text. 
102. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
103. Id. at 108-09. Guaranty Trust was a shareholders' class action suit filed in fed-
eral court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 100. The Court applied the New 
York statute of limitations which barred the suit. Id. at 110, 112. The Court went on to 
discuss "substance" and "procedure" in these terms: 
Id. at 109. 
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations 
is deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The ques-
tion is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and 
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the 
State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a 
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our 
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a liti-
gation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that 
would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the 
same parties in a State court. 
104. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
105. Id. at 533. In Ragan plaintiff filed a complaint regarding a highway accident in 
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 531. He did not serve process until 
after the expiration of the statute of limitations, claiming that under the federal rules 
the filing of the complaint tolled the statute. Id. Under state law, however, the statute of 
limitations was not tolled until service of process. Id. at 531. The Court held that state 
law controlled. Id. at 533. 
106. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
107. Id. at 470. Hanna concerned a complaint filed in federal court due to diversity 
of citizenship. Id. at 461. Plaintiff served defendant by leaving a copy of the summons at 
his house which satisfied FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). Id. Defendant obtained a summary judg-
ment on the basis that state law required in hand delivery of the summons. Id. at 462. 
The Court held that the federal rule superseded the state rule. Id. at 474. 
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use of the Federal Rules in diversity jurisdiction (Erie prob-
lempos and further elucidated the choice between "substantive" 
and "procedural" by reference to the goals of Erie: prevention of 
unfair discrimination against citizens of the forum state, and 
prevention of forum shopping.lo9 
After Hanna, the first question is to discover the coverage 
of the federal rule in question. It is only when there is no federal 
rule directly on point, or the federal and state rule directly con-
flict, that the Hanna analysis is needed.110 In Walker u. Armco 
Steel Corp.,111 however, the Supreme Court seemed to revive 
Ragan, by upholding a state law concerning the tolling of the 
statute of limitations.1l2 A unanimous Supreme Court specifi-
cally resolved Hanna and Walker in the 1987 Burlington North-
ern R. Co. U. WOOdS.l1S It upheld a federal rule over a state law 
even though the rules were not directly contradictory.ll4 Justice 
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982): "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right .... " 
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) "The test must be whether a rule 
really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recog-
nized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard 
or infraction of them." [d. at 14. 
109. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
110. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 210 (1985). The 
authors suggest a tripartite analysis under Hanna: (1) Does the federal rule actually gov-
ern the practice?; (2) If yes, is there a conflict between the federal and state rule? If the 
federal rule is narrower, then the state rule may be applied; and (3) if there is a direct 
conflict between the two rules, then is the federal rule a valid exercise of the power 
granted by Congress under the Rules Enabling Act? 
111. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
112. [d. at 749. In Walker plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a nail in federal court. 
[d. at 742. The state statute did not deem the action as commenced until service was 
made on defendants; the two year statute of limitations had expired before plaintiff did 
this. [d. at 742-43. Following the Hanna test, however, Justice Marshall wrote "The first 
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule is in fact sufficiently 
broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question is answered affirm-
atively that the Hanna analysis applies." [d. at 749. The Court cited Ragan, discussed in 
text accompanying notes 104-05, in ruling the action was time-barred. [d. 
113. 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987). 
114. [d. at 970, 971. In Burlington plaintiff brought a tort action in state court and 
defendant removed to federal court on diversity grounds. [d. at 968. Plaintiff won a judg-
ment and defendant posted bond to stay the judgment pending appeal. [d. Plaintiff then 
moved for imposition of the state's rule which requires a penalty of 10% of the judgment 
be assessed on an unsuccessful appellant who obtains of stay of the judgment. [d. at 967. 
Defendant claimed that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 applied. [d. at 968. That 
rule is discretionary and allows the court to award damages for a frivolous appeal. [d. 
In holding that the state statute had no application in judgments entered by federal 
courts sitting in diversity, the Court referred approvingly to Hanna and Walker: 
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Marshall wrote: 
The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing 
the development of a uniform system of rules gov-
erning federal practice and procedure suggests 
that Rules which incidentally affect litigants' sub-
stantive rights do not violate this provision (sub-
stantive rights provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 
2072) if reasonably necessary to maintain the in-
tegrity of that system of rules. lUi 
149 
In a conflict between state and federal law regarding re-
moval, the Supreme Court in Shamrock Oil Corp v. Sheets1l8 
said 
The removal statute, which is nationwide in its 
operation, was intended to be uniform in its ap-
plication, unaffected by local law definition or 
characterization of the subject matter to which it 
is to be applied. Hence the Act of Congress must 
be construed as setting up its own criteria, irre-
spective of local law, for determining in what in-
stances suits lire to be removed from the state to 
In Hanna v. Plumer, we set forth the appropriate test for 
resolving conflicts between state law ·and the Federal Rules. 
The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly con-
strued, the scope of Federal Rule 38 is 'sufficiently broad' to 
cause a 'direct collision' with the state law or, implicitly, to 
'control the issue' before the court, thereby leaving no room 
for the operation of that law. The Rule must then be applied 
if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rule-making au-
thority, which originates in the Constitution and has been be-
stowed on this Court by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2072. The consitutional constraints on the exercise of this 
rulemaking authority define a test of reasonableness. Rules 
regulating matters indisputably procedural are a priori consti-
tutional. Rules regulating matters 'which, though falling 
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, 
are rationally capable of classification as either,' also satisfy 
this constitutional standard. The Rules Enabling Act, how-
ever, contains an additional requirement. The Federal Rule 
must not 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ... 
.' 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
[d. at 969-70. (citations omitted) 
See also Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) in which 
the Supreme Court upheld a federal rule regarding the determination of venue in a di-
versity action over a state law. 
115. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 970. 
116. 313 U.S. 100 (1941). See supra note 56 for facts and holding. 
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the federal courts. 117 
In terms of relation back, where the state rule is more re-
strictive than Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), the federal rule generally 
supersedes the state.ll8 In Santana v. Holiday Inns1l9 the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that Rule 15(c) should be applied in a diversity 
case to allow relation back where the action would be barred 
under a more restrictive state law.120 
Where the state rule is more liberal, there has been disa-
greement.l2l In Marshall v. Mulrenin122 the First Circuit de-
cided that Rule 15(c) was superseded by a state rule allowing 
plaintiff to add a party who had no notice, after the statute of 
limitations period was up.123 It found the Massachusetts relation 
117. ld. at 104. 
118. 6 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1503 at 531 
(1971). See Hogan, supra note 33, at 111. 
119. 686 F.2d 736 (1982). 
120. ld. at 740. Santana concerned an action for a slander which occurred in Idaho. 
ld. at 737. Plaintiff filed in federal court in Arizona on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship and later sought to amend his complaint to add a claim for intentional interference 
with employment relations. ld. The action was time-barred under the Arizona statute of 
limitations, but not under the Idaho statute. ld. The Court of Appeals held that use of 
the forum state's statute was proper, but that the amended claim was saved by relation 
back under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). ld. The Santana court clarified its view of the Erie 
problem: 
Although at one time there was much debate over how a 
district court in a diversity action should choose between a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and a contrary state provi-
sion, the question is no longer in doubt. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
4508 (1982). In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that if there is a federal rule of procedure covering a 
particular point of practice or pleading in dispute, such rule 
governs in a federal diversity action even if resort to state law 
would lead to a different result. The only limitation on this 
principle is that the federal rule must not violate the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, or the Constitution. Rule 15(c) 
deals expressly with the relation back of amended pleadings 
and covers amendments alleging an additional cause of action. 
See 6 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 1503, at 534 .... We conclude that Hanna commands 
application of Rule 15(c) in the face of a contrary state rule. 
ld. at 740. (citation omitted) 
121. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 4509 at 152-59 (1982). 
122. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974). 
123. ld. at 44-45. In Marshall the plaintiff wife fell and injured herself on business 
premises and sued the owner of record. ld. at 40. In fact the business had new owners 
who had failed to file a new certificate. ld. By the time plaintiff discovered this fact and 
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back rule "although cast in procedural terms, has a direct sub-
stantive effect."l2. In Britt v. Arvanitis,121S on the other hand, 
the Third Circuit upheld Rule 15(c) over a state rule allowing 
substitution of Doe defendants and so the action was time-
barred.u6 
Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp.127 was the first Ninth Cir-
cuit case to consider the Erie problem of California Doe prac-
tried to substitute the proper defendants, the Massachusetts statute of limitations had 
run, and the district court held that FED. R. CIV. P. 15 barred the substitution. [d. at 40-
41. The Court of Appeals found that the state rule on amendments as to parties was 
substantive and superseded the federal rule, and allowed the substitution. [d. at 44-45. 
124. [d. at 44. 
125. 590 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
126. [d. at 62. Plaintiff Britt sued in district court on the ground that sutures used 
in his surgery were defective. [d. at 58. He sued the doctor, the hospital, the hospital 
administrator and, as a Doe, the manufacturer of the sutures. [d. Before the expiration 
of the statute of limitations Britt sought leave to amend the complaint to name Ethicon, 
Inc. in place of the Doe. [d. By the time leave was granted, the statute of limitations had 
run. [d. at 59. 
The issue was whether the amendment substituting a named defendant for a Doe 
related back to the filing of the original complaint, which depended on whether New 
Jersey state law concerning Doe pleading was substantive or procedural. [d. If proce-
dural, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) applied, barring the amendment. [d. at 60. The court con-
cluded that the state Doe pleading law was procedural. [d. at 61. Since the named de-
fendant had no notice of the action, the requirements of Rule 15(c) were not met, the 
amended complaint did not relate back, and the named defendant could not be substi-
tuted. [d. at 62. 
This holding is in direct contradiction to that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394 (1973). Like 
Bryant, this was a products liability case. [d. at 395. Plaintiff was injured while cleaning 
a machine at work. [d. He was unsure who manufactured the machine and sued a named 
defendant plus a Doe, one month before the expiration of the statute of limitations. [d. 
Ten months later he discovered the name of the real manufacturer and amended the 
complaint, substituting it for the Doe. [d. The original defendant was granted summary 
judgment, and the new defendant moved to set aside the amended complaint as barred 
by the statute of limitations. [d. 
The court held that the amended complaint related back. [d. at 399. In weighing 
justice against defendant's repose, the rule should be liberally construed: 
There is no suggestion that the lapse of time has resulted in 
loss of evidence or impairment of ability to defend; nor is 
there any suggestion that the plaintiffs have been advantaged 
by it. Justice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs 
their day in court on the merits of their claim; and the ab-
sence of prejudice, reliance or unjustifiable delay, strengthens 
the conclusions that this may fairly be done in the matter at 
hand 'without any undue impairment of the two-year limita-
tion or the considerations of repose which underlie it'. 
(citation omitted). [d. at 400. 
127. 424 F. Supp. 294 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
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tice.128 Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court with Does, and 
in federal court without Does.129 After the California statute of 
limitations had expired, she amended her federal complaint to 
add the Doe defendants. ISO The new defendants (former Does) 
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on the ground that Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(j)18l took precedence over Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 
474.182 The court said, "This mechanical reasoning, if embraced 
by the court, could pose a serious question concerning the valid-
ity of this local rule which, if so construed, could unfairly dis-
criminate against a plaintiff in a diversity case by withholding 
important substantive benefits available under state law."188 The 
court found no conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c): 
Nor does our holding conflict with 15(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The California 
statute of limitations scheme as applied in this 
case does not deal with the "relation back" doc-
trine at all but rather extends or tolls the limita-
tions period in the factual circumstances that ex-
ist in this case. Rule 15(c) is designed to provide a 
128. Molnar v. National Broadcasting Company, 231 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1956), (see 
supra note 72 for facts of the case), although decided earlier, did not get to the Erie 
problems of Doe pleadings. Although plaintiff's Doe allegations seemed without sub· 
stance, her complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. [d. at 687. She was still 
within the statute of limitations period and had plenty of time to name other defend-
ants. [d. at 686. 
129. Rumberg, 424 F. Supp. at 296. In Rumberg the widow of a military pilot sued 
for wrongful death, alleging that his death was caused by malfunction of the aircraft's 
cockpit ejection system. [d. at 296. She filed in federal court naming no Doe defendants 
and also filed an identical action in state court naming Does. [d. Over one year later she 
discovered the identity of two other potential tortfeasors and sought to add them by 
amendment to her federal complaint (she substituted them for Does in her state com-
plaint). [d. The court held that the combination of the California statute of limitations 
and the Doe pleading practice produced the functional equivalent of a four year limita-
tions period. [d. at 297. 
130. [d. at 296. 
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j) provides 120 days to serve defendant. See supra note 88 for 
text. 
132. CAL. CIV. PROC.CODE § 474 authorizes Doe pleading. See supra note 32 for text. 
133. Rumberg, 424 F. Supp. at 297. The court defined the relevant California stat-
utes as substantive in these terms: 
[d. 
Taken together, CCP §§ 340(3), 474 and 581(a) can, depending 
on the date the complaint is filed, provide the functional 
equivalent of a limitations period of up to four years. For such 
limitations period to apply two conditions must be met: (1) 
The plaintiff must file suit within one year of the accrual of 
the cause of action, and (2) the plaintiff must be unaware of 
the identify of certain defendants when the complaint is filed. 
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uniform solution to statute of limitations 
problems when amendments are sought after the 
limitations period has expired; it was not 
designed to determine the length of the limita-
tions period to be applied.134 
153 
Lindley v. General Elec. Co.13& adopted "Rum berg as the 
reasoning of the (Ninth) circuit".136 The Lindley court found 
that the effect of Cal. Civ. Proc.Code Section 474 is to extend 
the substantive statute of limitations, and thus there is no con-
flict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).137 California Doe pleading was 
considered substantive and binding on the federal courts.18S 
In enacting Section 909 of the Court Reform and Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act of 1988, Congress has specifically rejected the 
Lindley court's reasoning. For removal purposes the citizenship 
of Doe defendants is to be disregarded.139 The Erie problem of 
the conflict between the state and federal laws would probably 
be resolved in favor of the federal law under the reasoning of 
Shamrock. 140 
134. [d. at 300-01. 
135. 780 F.2d 797, cert. denied sub nom. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. 
Lindley, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). 
136. [d. at 800. In Lindley, plaintiffs filed in state court against a named defendant 
and Does. [d. at 798-99. Defendant removed to federal court. [d. at 798. After the one-
year statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs moved to substitute Stone and Webster 
Engineering Corporation for a Doe. [d. The district court dismissed the action against 
Stone & Webster because they had not received notice under FED. R. CIV. P.15(c), but the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that under California law naming Doe defendants 
is a substantive right, and plaintiffs have three years in which to serve defendants. [d. at 
798, 800. The court found the conflict between RULE 15(c) and state Doe practice to be 
"bogus"; and that "the absence of a federal pleading mechanism should not deprive a 
plaintiff of the extension of the limitations period provided under California Doe prac-
tice." [d. at 802. 
137. [d. at 801. 
138. [d. at 802. 
139. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, § 909(a), see supra note 6 
for text. 
140. 313 U.S. 100 (1941), see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS-BRYANT v. FORD MOTOR 
CO. 
A. MAJORITY 
The Ninth Circuit met en banc to develop a coherent stan-
dard regarding Doe pleading in the federal courts. HI It noted the 
numerous exceptions to its general rule that naming Doe de-
fendants defeats diversity jurisdiction, and pointed out these ex-
ceptions have led to inconsistency and confusion.142 
The majority then laid out its new "bright line" without 
further discussion or analysis. It ruled that the naming of Doe 
defendants destroyed diversity and precluded removal.148 The 
nature of the allegations against Doe defendants was irrele-
vant.144 All of its previous cases which created exceptions based 
on nominal Does were overruled. l4G Under the Bryant rule the 
30-day time limit for removal146 would not begin until all Doe 
defendants were either named, unequivocally abandoned by the 
plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court. H7 Unequivocal aban-
donment occurred where (1) the plaintiff dropped the Doe de-
fendants from the complaint, or (2) the trial began without ser-
vice of the Doe defendants.148 The majority thought this rule 
accomodated both plaintiff's right to a three year extension of 
the statute of limitations, and defendant's right to removal. 149 
All pending cases had to be remanded to state court, unless both 
parties agreed to dismiss Doe defendants. 1110 
B. CONCURRENCE 
Judge Norris concurred with the judgment on the narrow 
facts presented in this case. Uil He thought that defendant Ford 
141. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). 




146. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982), see supra note 51 for text of statute. 
147. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605-06. 
148. [d. n.5. 
149. See supra notes 32-45, and 48-51 and accompanying text. 
150. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.7. 
151. [d. at 607, (Norris, J. concurring). 
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had made no effort to show that none of the Doe defendants, 
who Bryant claimed were responsible for the lack of a shoulder 
harness in the van, were California residents. 162 Therefore Ford 
did not carry its burden of showing complete diversity on its re-
moval petition.16s 
Judge Norris, however, disagreed with the new rule under 
which Does were presumed to be real and nondiverse.164 Under 
Pullman he felt that defendant must be given the opportunity 
to prove that no legitimate defendant is a resident. He quoted 
Pullman: "'It is always open to the nonresident defendant to 
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good 
faith and for that reason should not be considered in determin-
ing the right to remove.' "166 
C. DISSENT 
Judge Kozinski's blistering dissent is by far the longest part 
of Bryant v. Ford Motor Co.. Reasoning that most Does are 
nominal and should be disregarded for diversity purposes,lIi6 he 
wrote that the new "bright line" rule was wrong for two reasons: 
(1) it conflicts with the policy of the federal removal statute; and 
(2) it would create serious practical problems. lli7 
He concluded that the effect of the new rule was that re-
moval may occur on the eve of trial, which may be three years or 




155. Id. quoting Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939). See supra notes 62 
and 75-78 and accompanying text for facts and discussion of that case. 
156. Id. at 608 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
157. Id. at 610, 612 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
158. Id. at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See a/so, CTS Printex, Inc. v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 1272, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In CTS Printex plaintiff 
filed in state court naming a defendant plus 50 Does. Id. at 1273. The named defendant 
removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. The court said defend-
ant may remove when the case first becomes removable, 
which normally will occur when plaintiff has manifested an in-
tention to abandon his case against the Does. It is fair to note 
that this may occur on the eve of trial (if trial occurs within 
three years of filing of the complaint)-an undesirable devel-
opment -but procedures may be available in state court to 
bring the issue of removability to an earlier resolution. 
29
Foe: Federal Jurisdiction
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
156 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:127 
than the thirty days mandated in 28 U.S.C. Section 1446,lli9 and 
is contrary to Congressional policies that removal be both 
speedy and uniform nationwide.160 
Deferring removal so long would create duplication of effort. 
All interlocutory rulings of the state court, which include discov-
ery, summary judgment motions, stays and injunctions, were 
subject to reconsideration.161 
Judge Kozinski argued that under Hanna and Burlington 
Northern R.R., the Federal Rules take precedence over the (pro-
cedural) Doe pleading practice.162 This includes the conflicts re-
garding naming parties, service on defendant, adding parties and 
relation back.16s 
He disagreed with the relation back ruling in Lindley 164 
which presumed Does to be real, allowing joinder of Doe defend-
ants in federal court as a matter of state substantive law. 1611 He 
noted the inconsistency between Lindley and Santana. 166 Lind-
ley mandated the use of Doe pleading when it lengthened the 
statute of limitations; Santana mandated the application of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(c) when it lengthened the state statute of limita-
tions. He wondered: is plaintiff's right to add parties more im-
portant than defendant's right of repose?167 
Finally, Judge Kozinski suggested an alternative: treating 
[d. at 1277. 
159. See supra note 51 for text of statute. 
160. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
161. [d. at 612 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). He cited 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1982) which 
provides in the pertinent part: "All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in 
such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or 
modified by the district court." 
162. [d. at 616-17 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
163. See supra notes 66-100 and accompanying text. 
164. Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 801, cert. denied sub nom. Stone & 
Webster Engineering Corp. v. Lindley, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). See supra notes 135-38 and 
accompanying text for a full discussion of Lindley. 
165. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 617-19 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). If the Ninth Circuit had 
been consistent in following Lindley, it would have allowed all California plaintiffs to 
name Does in their pleadings in federal court, not merely allowing amendment of the 
complaint after removal. 
166. [d. at 619, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
167. [d. (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See supra, notes 119-20, and 135-38 for a discus-
sion of Santana and Lindley. 
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Does as procedural fictions and using the Federal Rules in fed-
eral court.188 Congress agreed. 
v. A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS CRE-
ATED BY BRYANT 
The Ninth Circuit was eager to create a clear and simple 
standard governing Doe pleading in the federal courts.189 The 
majority's new "bright line" rule announced in Bryant simplified 
an area that "unfortunately remains shrouded in mystery and 
confusion."17o Unfortunately, the dearth of briefing and analysis 
led the Ninth Circuit to a decision contrary to Congressional 
intent.171 
168. Bryant, 832 F.2d at 1096 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
169. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). 
170. Goldberg v. CPC Intern., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233 (N. D. Cal. 1980). In Goldberg 
plaintiffs filed a class action in California state court, naming eight corporations and 100 
Doe defendants. Id. at 235. Defendants filed a petition to remove, and plaintiffs moved 
to remand, alleging that some of the Does were California residents. Id. at 235-36. The 
court held that complete diversity was not shown by the defendant and remanded the 
case. Id. at 240. The court's exposition of the Doe pleading problem was: 
Defendants' principal contention is that the Doe defendants 
were joined solely to destroy diversity and must be disre-
garded. Doe defendants, however, are not automatically disre-
garded for jurisdictional purposes. But the circumstances 
under which they are or are not disregarded unfortunately re-
main shrouded in mystery and confusion. In large part this 
situation is the consequence of the time limit imposed on peti-
tion for removal by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (and its precursors), 
requiring the petition to be filed within thirty days of receipt 
of the initial pleading or other paper 'from which it may first 
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become re-
movable.' A failure to remove a case when first filed results in 
a loss of the right to remove later unless it is determined that 
it was not then removable. The ironic consequence is that a 
liberal policy toward removal at a later stage in the action 
compels taking a narrow view of federal jurisdiction over the 
complaint as initially filed, and vice versa. In the case of Doe 
allegations, permitting removal upon a later abandonment or 
severance of the claims against Does necessarily presupposes 
that the Doe allegations on their face were sufficient to destroy 
diversity. 
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted). 
171. Judge Kozinski in his dissent notes that the Doe pleading issue was not briefed 
by either of the parties. Furthermore, the new rule was based on a previous Ninth Cir-
cuit district court case, CTS Printex, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp 
1272 (N.D. Cal. 1986), in which the issue was not briefed either. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 608 
(Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
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The Bryant rule was applied immediately and retroactively: 
federal courts were ordered to remand pending cases containing 
Does to state court.172 Orders remanding cases to state court are 
ordinarily not appealable.173 The effect of the Bryant rule was to 
initially reduce the workload of the Ninth Circuit,t74 as almost 
all California tort claims would remain in state court for three 
years.175 Although Congress too wanted to reduce the federal di-
versity caseload, the Bryant rule was seen to create great uncer-
tainty and interference with the right of removal. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE BRYANT RULE 
1. Jurisdiction When Plaintiff Fails to Object to Removal 
In choosing the Bryant case to apply the new rule, the 
Ninth Circuit placed itself in conflict with the Supreme Court 
on the issue of jurisdiction. When removal is based on diversity 
jurisdiction, complete diversity must exist both at the time the 
original complaint was filed in state court, and at the time of 
removaP76 However, when plaintiff fails to object to defendant's 
removal and the case proceeds to judgment, the Supreme Court 
uses a different test than applies to an initial consideration of 
removal jurisdiction.177 Instead of strictly requiring complete di-
172. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.7. 
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). See supra note 52 for the text. 
174. W. Slomanson, John Doe Strikes Out in the Ninth, 8 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 4, 51 
(May, 1988). Slomanson wrote about Bryant. He said, "The Ninth Circuit is the nation's 
busiest federal circuit, and California contributes more cases than any other state in the 
circuit. In 1987, 18 percent of the circuit's 40,853 new cases relied on diversity jurisdic-
tion. By remanding many of those cases, Bryant decreased the federal case load." [d. at 
55. Slomanson did an informal poll of California federal trial judges and magistrates. 
Fifty-six percent of those responding answered that cases containing Doe allegations 
should never be removed. [d. at 53. The judges favoring removal suggested four excep-
tions to the ban on removal: (1) when Does are clearly procedural, fictitious or sham; (2) 
when the Does' citizenship becomes known; (3) when the case is at issue and no Does 
have been served; and (4) when plaintiff "indicates" his belief that there are no remain-
ing defendants. [d. at 53. 
175. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See supra notes 32-46 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Doe pleading practice in California. 
The majority, however, disagreed, arguing that the time for obtaining a trial date in 
California is less than three years. [d. at 606 n.6. However, under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
582.210, supra note 43, plaintiff has three years to serve defendants. 
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of removal 
requirements. 
177. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 49, § 
3723 at 319 (2d. ed. 1984). 
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versity at both filing and removal, there need only be complete 
diversity at filing or judgment.178 As enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp.179 the test is: 
[W]here after removal a case is tried on the mer-
its without objection and the federal court enters 
judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on 
appeal is not whether the case was properly re-
moved, but whether the federal district court 
would have had original jurisdiction of the case 
had it been filed in that court. ISO 
The Court further explained, "We have concluded that, 
whether or not the case was properly removed, the District 
Court did have jurisdiction of the parties at the time it entered 
judgment. Under such circumstances the validity of the removal 
procedure followed may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal. "181 
The Ninth Circuit applies the Grubbs test even where the 
178. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16, (1951) In a suit for recov-
ery on an insurance policy plaintiff named two nonresident insurance companies and one 
resident agent. [d. at 7-8. Only one wrong was alleged, and the three defendants were 
joined because of uncertainty as to who was liable; therefore the controversy was non-
separable. [d. at 8. Because there was no diversity either at the time of removal or at 
final judgment, the decision of the District Court was vacated and the case was re-
manded to state court. [d. at 17-18. The Court said: 
[d. at 16. 
There are cases which uphold judgments in the district courts 
even though there was no right to removal. In those cases the 
federal trial court would have had original jurisdiction of the 
controversy had it been brought in the federal court in the 
posture it had at the time of the actual trial of the cause or of 
the entry of the judgment. That is, if the litigation had been 
initiated in the federal court on the issues and between the 
parties that comprised the case at the time of trial or judg-
ment, the federal court would have had cognizance of the case. 
179. 405 U.S. 699 (1972). 
180. [d. at 702. In Grubbs plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note and defendant 
cross-complained and included the United States as a party. [d. at 700. The United 
States removed to federal court without objection, and the case was tried in the District 
Court. [d. at 701. After losing plaintiff appealed. [d. at 702. The Court of Appeals de-
cided that the United States was improperly joined. [d. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the district court did have jurisdiction at the time of judgment. [d. at 705. The Court 
noted that "the removal statutes and decisions of this Court are intended to have uni-
form nationwide application." [d. 
181. [d. at 700. 
33
Foe: Federal Jurisdiction
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
160 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:127 
final judgment is by summary judgment.182 
Bryant filed in state court, alleging but not serving Does de-
fendants. He failed to object to removal. 188 When defendant 
Ford moved for summary judgment, Bryant opposed, saying he 
intended to name Does later.184 Ford was granted summary 
judgment.1811 As we have seen, Bryant would not have been able 
to file in a Ninth Circuit federal court naming Doe defend-
ants.18S Since he had not identified the Doe defendants, nor were 
they properly before the federal court, the only parties in the 
federal action at the time of the summary judgment were Bryant 
and Ford who were completely diverse. ls7 The fact that there 
were other parties whom Bryant wished to sue did not defeat 
the jurisdiction of the district court. Under Grubbs the district 
court had jurisdiction and the subsequent remand was 
unnecessary. ISS 
182. Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Seafar-
ers Int'l Union, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). In Stone a divorced wife sued the Seafarers Interna-
tional Union Pension Plan for her community property share of her husband's pension. 
Id. at 741. The Plan removed to federal court without objection, but received a summary 
judgment against it. Id. at 741-42. The court quoted the Grubbs rule, and held it applies 
to summary judgments. Id. at 742. In Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 
769 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) plaintiff sued her deceased hus-
band's insurance company (a non-resident) and two attorneys (residents). Id. at 771. The 
state court dismissed the claims against the two attorneys, and plaintiff appealed. Id. 
While the appeal was pending, the non-resident insurance company removed. Id. at 771. 
The insurance company received a summary judgment, and plaintiff petitioned for a re-
hearing, raising for the first time the removal jurisdiction, and also moved for remand. 
Id. The district court denied the remand motion. Ii Although she had appealed dismis-
sal of the resident defendants, because plaintiff did not take an interlocutory appeal of 
the denial of her remand motion, she became subject to the Grubbs test which requires 
diversity only at the time of final judgment. Id. at 773. The court stated "Essentially, the 
rule requires an appellant to have a remand issue certified for interlocutory review. Oth-
erwise an appellant will bear the risk that subject matter jurisdiction will exist at final 
judgment, and she will be deemed to have waived the iscue." Id. at 774. 
183. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 603. See Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 798-99 
(9th Cir. 1987) (because plaintiff did not seek an interlocutory appeal of the order deny-
ing his motion to remand, the only issue before the court was whether the district court 
had jurisdiction); Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co, 847 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 
1988), (failure to file an interlocutory appeal prevents plaintiff from raising the objection 
later). 
184. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. 
185. Id. 
186. See Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp 294 (C.D. Cal. 1976), see 
supra note 129 and accompanying text for discussion. 
187. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. 
188. Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 700 (1972). See supra 
notes 179-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the Grubbs test. Since Ford had 
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The Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 ad-
dressed this issue by amending the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
Section 1447(c). It provides: 
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any 
defect in removal procedure must be made within 
30 days after the filing of the notice of removal 
under section 1446(a). If at any time before final 
judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be re-
manded."(emphasis added).189 
The legislative history accompanying the Act points out that the 
remand is only required for lack of federal subject matter, not 
diversity jurisdiction. ISO The legislative history states: 
There is no reason why either State or Federal 
courts, or the parties, should be subject to the 
burdens of shuttling a case between two courts 
that each have subject matter jurisdiction. There 
is also some risk that a party who is aware of a 
defect in removal procedure may hold the defect 
in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the lit-
igation should take an unfavorable turn. lSI 
This, of course, is exactly what Bryant did after Ford Motor Co. 
obtained a summary judgment. 
2. Fraudulent Joinder 
The Bryant rule failed to consider the problem of fraudu-
lent joinder, where plaintiff names Doe defendants solely to de-
feat removal and keep the case in state court. In overruling the 
exceptions to the general rule banning Doe pleading in federal 
court, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its previous distinction be-
received a summary judgment, remand was unnecessary under Grubbs. However, if Bry-
ant had objected to removal, and there had been no final judgment, then remand would 
have been required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
The Bryant majority addressed this issue after citing the Grubbs test: "Even under 
this standard, however, remand is required. The presence of Doe defendants destroys 
diversity of citizenship. Here, the Doe defendants were never dismissed. Accordingly, 
original jurisdiction would not have lain with the district court." Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 
n.9. The question, of course, is whether the Doe defendants were "present" or not. 
189. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, § 909(c). 
190. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REPT. 100-889, l00th 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
162 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:127 
tween real but unidentified Does, and sham Does.192 In Bryant it 
is clear that the Does were real: Bryant was actively searching 
for the identities of real defendants.19a Judge Kozinski, however, 
believed that in "a fair number of cases-perhaps the over-
whelming majority-all the parties that will ever turn up are al-
ready before the court and the presence of Doe allegations im-
pairs removal for absolutely no good reason."19. 
Federal courts have been reluctant to consider plaintiff's 
motives in naming parties in order to defeat diversity jurisdic-
tion.1911 The only statute considering motive, 28 U.S.C. Section 
1359/96 "expresses a policy against the creation of federal juris-
diction and not against its avoidance".197 The regulation of 
plaintiff's improper joinder of resident defendants just to defeat 
diversity has been left to the state courts.198 As we have seen, 
however, in California the requirements for Doe pleading are 
very liberaL 199 
On the other hand, the joinder of a formal or unnecessary 
192. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 609 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
193. At the time of summary judgment Bryant was still searching to discover the 
identities of the manufacturers of the body and the passive restraint system. [d. at 604. 
194. [d. at 609 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). The majority, however, disagreed with this 
assumption. [d. at 606 n.6. 
195. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931) "In a 
removal proceeding the motive of a plaintiff in joining defendants is immaterial, pro-
vided there is in good faith a cause of action against those joined."(emphasis added); 
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913) in which plaintiff sued 
railway and railway employee. [d. at 192. Justice Holmes wrote "Again, the motive of the 
plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove. If there is a joint liability he 
has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert 
the right." [d. at 193. 
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988) provides: 
Parties collusively joined or made. 
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action 
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been im-
properly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of such court. 
197. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE supra note 49, § 
3641 at 129 (2d. ed. 1985). 
198. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 49, § 
3641 at 132 (2d ed. 1985). See also, Wallis v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 61 
Cal. App. 3d 782, 132 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1st Dist. 1976), see supra note 35 for facts. The 
Wallis court said "The question as to whether the plaintiff has acted good faith in his 
use of [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE) section 474 rests primarily with the trial court." [d. at 785, 
132 Cal. Rptr. at 634. 
199. See supra notes 32·43 and accompanying text. 
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party does not defeat diversity jurisdiction.20o And, assuming 
Pullman is still good law, defendant is allowed to show fraudu-
lent joinder, and thus to remove.201 In Wilson v. Republic Iron 
& Steel Company202 the Supreme Court found that plaintiff 
joined an employee with no connection to the complaint as a 
defendant solely in order to fraudulently defeat his employer's 
right of removal, and upheld removal. 203 Fraudulent joinder is 
found when plaintiff has no reasonable basis in fact, or ground 
supporting the cause of action against the defendant, or no good 
200. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1923). See supra note 
74 for facts. In Salem Trust defendant trust company was a stakeholder and its citizen-
ship did not affect diversity. [d. at 185. 
201. Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939). See supra note 62, for details of 
the case. See also, Holloway v. Pacific Indem. Co., 422 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
In Holloway, plaintiff filed suit against his insurance company and John Doe in Michi-
gan state court. [d. at 1037. Defendant removed, and plaintiff was granted remand on 
the ground that his complaint stated a proper cause of action against the Doe. [d. at 
1041-42. 
[d. at 1038. 
Plaintiff urges that remand is required whenever a Doe de-
fendant is alleged to be a resident of the forum. The rule of 
Pullman is not as clear and all-encompassing as plaintiff con-
tends, however. Indeed, to read that case as broadly as plain-
tiff urges would permit litigants to destroy the federal courts' 
removal jurisdiction by merely naming a sham co-defendant 
alleged to reside in the forum state. The Pullman court ex-
pressly noted that "It is always open to the non-resident to 
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good 
faith .... Thus 'John Doe' defendants may be disregarded in 
determining the propriety of removal if they are merely nomi-
nal parties or sham parties against whom no real relief is 
sought. 
202. 257 U.S. 92 (1921). 
203. [d. at 97. In Wilson plaintiff employee brought an action against his employer 
and a coemployee; he filed in Alabama state court [d. at 93. Employer removed to fed-
eral court, alleging that the coemployee was joined merely to defeat diversity. [d. at 93-
94. The court found the joinder to be a sham and fraudulent. [d. at 98. 
[Tlhis right of removal cannot be defeated' by a fraudulent 
joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with 
the controversy. If in such a case a resident defendant is 
joined, the joinder, although fair upon its face, may be shown 
by a petition for removal to be only a sham or fraudulent de-
vice to prevent removal; but the showing must consist of a 
statement of facts rightly leading to that conclusion apart 
from the pleader's deductions .... But if the plaintiff does not 
take issue with what is stated in the petition, he must be 
taken as assenting to its truth and the petitioning defendant 
need not produce any proof to sustain it. 
[d. at 97 (citations omitted). 
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faith intention to prosecute against him.204 
In considering fraudulent joinder of Doe defendants, the 
Ninth Circuit previously held that after the named defendant 
petitions for removal, plaintiff's failure to challenge defendant's 
statement that there were no other parties; or plaintiff's own 
statement that there were no other parties, showed fraudulent 
joinder of the Does, allowing removal,2°1i The former Ninth Cir-
cuit rule allowed removal when the Doe defendants seemed mere 
"phantoms". In Grigg v. Southern Pacific CO.206 plaintiff filed in 
state court, alleging but not serving Doe defendants. On the eve 
of trial, when defendant moved to remove, plaintiff tried to get 
an extension to find and serve the Does. The court found "le-
gally his Does were a sham" and allowed removal.207 Under the 
204. [d. at 98 (plaintiff had no good faith intention to prosecute). See also Herzig v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 845, 848 (S.D. Cal. 1955), see infra note 
205 for a discussion of the facts. The Herzig court explained: 
[d. at 848. 
But where it appears that the plaintiff has no intention of 
serving the resident defendants and attempting to recover 
judgment against them, the Court is justified in concluding, as 
a matter of fact, that they were joined in bad faith for the sole 
purpose of preventing Federal jurisdiction, and that, hence, 
the joinder is fraudulent. 
205. Herzig v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 845, 847-48 (S.D. 
Cal. 1955) In Herzig plaintiff filed a complaint in state court naming Twentieth Century-
Fox as well as John Doe and John Doe Corporation, alleged to be residents of California. 
[d. at 846. Twentieth Century-Fox removed to federal court, and plaintiff successfully 
remanded. [d. at 847. After remand, plaintiff submitted a memorandum for setting for 
trial in which he admitted that he had no other complaint or affirmative pleadings, and 
that no other parties would be served. [d. Twentieth Century-Fox again filed for re-
moval. [d. The federal district court concluded that plaintiff had named the Doe defend-
ants for the purpose of preventing federal jurisdiction, so the joinder was fraudulent. [d. 
at 848. Therefore federal diversity jurisdiction was proper and removal allowed. [d. See 
also Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(plaintiff admitted in its brief that plaintiff had no intention of ever naming Doe defend-
ants, and failed to contest defendant's affidavit identifying Does who were all diverse); 
West America Corp. v. Vaughan-Bassett Furniture, 765 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(court dismissed Does as sham when plaintiff failed to contest defendant's affidavit iden-
tifying Does who were all diverse). But cf. Hughes Construction Co. v. Rheem Manufac-
turing Co., 487 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Miss. 1980) In Hughes plaintiff filed against named 
defendants and Does in Mississippi state court. [d. at 346. Defendants removed, and 
plaintiff filed to remand. [d. at 347. The court found insufficient particularity in the 
charging allegations against the Does. [d. at 348. Because defendants alleged in their 
affidavits that the corporations had no officers, agents, or employees residing in Missis-
sippi, they met their burden of showing the Doe defendants were not joined in good 
faith. [d. at 349. 
206. 246 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1957). 
207. [d. at 620, see supra note 70 and accompanying text for facts and discussion. 
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old rule removal was also allowed when the complaint contained 
no charging allegations against the Doe defendants.208 
In an effort to avoid the difficulties of piercing the plead-
ings, the Bryant court gave every benefit of the doubt to plain-
tiff's allegations, no matter how vague they were. Because the 
rule gave no consideration to plaintiff's real intentions, it seemed 
to fly in the face of defendant's right under Pullman to show 
fraudulent joinder. 
3. The "Bright-Line" Rule as Dicta 
Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent that the Bryant rule 
was essentially dicta, going far beyond the decision necessary to 
rule on the facts in Bryant. 
At the time of summary judgment, Bryant was aware that 
Ford had manufactured only the chassis of the van, and was not 
responsible for the allegedly defective seatbelt.209 He was still 
actively searching for the real identities of the Doe defendants 
and had neither named them as mere nominal parties, nor aban-
doned them.210 The Bryant court, in its quest to simplify Doe 
pleading practice, went past the ruling necessary for this case to 
make a sweeping rule concerning when removal will be permit-
ted. It said the 30-day time limit for removal would not begin 
until all Doe defendants were either named, unequivocally aban-
doned by the plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court.2l1 Judge 
Kozinski in his dissent, however, labelled this statement as 
dicta: 
In an effort to adopt a simple rule that will solve 
all problems, the court goes on and addresses the 
second question: when Doe allegations disappear 
from a case by abandonment or otherwise. But 
the court is in no position to speak on this issue 
The court observed "We suggest not that Grigg deceived or attempted to deceive. But 
legally his Does were a sham. He never attempted to identify or charge a Doe until he 
found he was in trouble-his case was going to a court where he preferred not to go. This 
was too late." [d. at 620. 
208. Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). 
see supra note 83 for details of the case. 
209. Bryant. 844 F.2d at 604. 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 605-06. 
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because the case before us does not present the 
issue of abandonment: No one has claimed that 
the Doe defendants have been abandoned and 
every indication is that the plaintiff fully intends 
to rely on the Doe allegations. Under these cir-
cumstances, that part of the court's bright-line 
rule is, quite simply, dicta, and very mischievous 
dicta at that. Perhaps because the issue is not 
presented to us in a concrete controversy, the rule 
the court adopts runs rough-shod over the statu-
tory language and demonstrably excludes a vari-
ety of situations where federal jurisdiction is au-
thorized by the removal statute.212 
The rigidity of the Bryant rule concerning when Doe de-
fendants can be disregarded for removal purposes presented the 
following problems with respect to the voluntary-involuntary 
rule and the concept of "unequivocal abandonment". 
4. Conflicts with the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule 
The Bryant rule seemed to conflict with the voluntary-in-
voluntary rule.21S The Bryant court promulgated a new rule re-
garding the period for removal in a footnote. 214 The period for 
removal will begin only when all Doe defendants are either (1) 
named; (2) unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff; or (3) dis-
missed by the state court.2UI The latter, dismissal on the merits, 
seemed to conflict with the voluntary-involuntary rule, which 
says that only plaintiff's voluntary action in abandoning or dis-
missing resident defendants can create the diverse conditions for 
defendant to remove.216 This means that even a final state court 
decision on the merits dismissing the resident defendant, will 
not create diversity.217 As stated in Self v. General Motors 
212. [d. at 613 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
213. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. 
214. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.6. 
215. [d. at 605-06. 
216. Self v. General Motors corp., 588 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1978), see supra note 
59 for facts and discussion. 
217. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S. 
246 (1909), see supra note 65 for facts and holding. See also Whitcomp v. Smithson, 175 
U.S. 635, 638, (1900). In Whitcomb plaintiff sued a railway and receivers for personal 
injuries. [d. at 635. The defendants removed and the Circuit Court remanded. [d. at 635-
37. The railway received a directed verdict which was a decision on the merits, and since 
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Corp.218: "It is also settled that a case, arising under the laws of 
the United States, non-removable on the complaint when com-
menced, cannot be converted into a removable one by evidence 
of the defendant or by an order of the court upon any such issue 
tried upon the merits."219 
The Bryant court may, however, have been considering an-
other policy basis of the voluntary-involuntary rule. Since juris-
diction is fundamental to courts, a dismissal by the court due to 
lack of jurisdiction does not fall under the voluntary-involun-
tary rule.220 Footnote six of Bryant221 was added after the opin-
ion was first published, probably in an effort to reconcile Bryant 
with the voluntary-involuntary rule. It says that the voluntary-
involuntary rule "applies only to state court judgments on the 
merits against named defendants. This rule is inapplicable to 
the dismissal by state courts of Doe defendants."222 The Bryant 
court may have meant that any state court dismissal of the Does 
must be based on jurisdictional grounds only. The voluntary-in-
voluntary rule is inapplicable because dismissal on the merits 
can occur only when defendants are identified and present in 
court. But since little or nothing is known about the Doe defend-
ants as long as they remain fictitious, the state court has little 
basis for any jurisdictional rulings. On the other hand, in Gould 
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,223 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the voluntary-involuntary rule "does not allow creation of diver-
sity removal jurisdiction by court order dismissing the nondi-
verse defendants".224 It is difficult, without assuming the logical 
the dismissal was without plaintiff's consent, the case did not therefore become remova-
ble. [d. at 638. 
218. 588 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1978). 
219. Id. at 659. The Self court mentions that fraudulent joinder is an exception to 
the voluntary-involuntary rule. [d. . 
220. Whitcomb, 175 U.S. at 638. The Court emphasized that the state court's dis-
missal of the resident defendant "was a ruling on the merits, and not a ruling on the 
question of jurisdiction." [d. at 638. See Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249 (11th Cir. 
1988). The jurisdictional exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule was followed to its 
logical conclusion in Insinga, an Eleventh Circuit case decided subsequent to Bryant 
which allowed removal after the resident defendant was dismissed on sovereign immu-
nity grounds, 8 jurisdictional defense. [d. at 254. The court also affirmed that fraudulent 
joinder is an exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule. [d. at 254. 
221. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.6. 
222. [d. 
223. 790 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986), see supra note 182 for facts and discussion. 
224. Id. at 773. The Gould court was following the rule of Self, see supra notes 57-
65 and accompanying text. 
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impossibility of a state court dismissal of unknown Does on ju-
risdictional grounds, to reconcile the two cases. 
It may be that dismissal of Doe defendants by the state 
court can occur in very limited circumstances. The first Ninth 
Circuit post-Bryant case to consider this problem, Bertha v. 
Beech Aircraft Corporation,22r, suggested that to avoid conflicts 
with the voluntary-involuntary rule, the court may dismiss Does 
at a trial setting conference only. Under Cal. R. Court 220(b)(3), 
the trial setting conference procedure, the court may not dismiss 
a fictitious defendant without the consent of all parties, which 
constitutes a voluntary action by plaintiff.228 The Bertha court 
noted, "To permit court-ordered dismissals of Doe defendants 
under other circumstances to trigger removals might well be 
contrary to Self, an issue not addressed in Bryant."227 
5. "Unequivocal Abandonment" Unclear 
The second action triggering the removal period under the 
Bryant rule, plaintiff's unequivocal abandonment of his action 
against Doe defendants, was unclear. The court briefly discussed 
it in a footnote: "Unequivocal abandonment occurs in only two 
situations: (1) where the plaintiff drops the Doe defendants from 
the complaint or (2) where the trial commences without service 
of the Doe defendants. "228 
Under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 
1446(b), the mere lapse of the period to serve process is insuffi-
cient to allow removal; plaintiff must file an amended pleading, 
225. 674 F. Supp. 24 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In Bertha plaintiffs filed against a diverse 
defendants and 100 Does. After more than three years had passed, plaintiffs served the 
remaining defendant with an At-Issue Memorandum in which they represented that all 
essential parties had been served with process and no others would be served. Defendant 
removed and plaintiff moved for a remand, stating they intended to serve two resident 
defendants. Although the court said Bryant "would seemingly require remand of this 
case," it quoted the "mischievous dicta" part of the dissent and held that the combina-
tion of the expiration of the period to serve under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.210 and the 
memorandum showed "unequivocal abandonment" and allowed removal. 
226. CAL. R. COURT 220(b)(3) provides: "The court shall not ... dismiss fictitious 
defendants or condition the setting of a trial date upon the dismissal of such fictitious 
defendants without the consent of all parties." 
227. Bertha, 674 F. Supp. at 26 n.2. 
228. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.5. 
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motion, order or "other paper" showing diversity.229 After re-
ceipt of this paper, defendant has thirty days to petition for re-
moval. The problem was what "paper" was sufficient to show 
plaintiff's unequivocal intention of abandoning Does? 
California Rules of Court require parties to file an At-Issue 
Memorandum in order to secure a place on a civil active list or 
to be set for trial.230 Prior cases deciding when Does were aban-
doned often turned on the wording of the At-Issue Memoran-
dum where plaintiff affirmed that all essential defendants, not 
all possible defendants have been served.231 In Barngrover v. 
M. V. Tunisian Reefer32 the district court ruled that plaintiffs 
filing of an At-Issue Memorandum showed an intention to aban-
don Doe defendants, and triggered removability.233 On the other 
hand, in Goodman v. Travelers Ins. CO.,2S4 an At-Issue Memo-
randum did not signify abandonment of Doe defendants. And 
the Memorandum itself may not be sufficiently clear. In 
Silverman & Assoc. v. Drai,m plaintiff's At-Issue Memorandum 
made no representation that other parties would not be 
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides: 
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a 
petition for removal may be filed within thirty days after re-
ceipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy 
of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is 
or has become removable. 
230. CAL. R. COURT 209. 
231. Casparian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
232. 535 F. Supp. 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
233. [d. 1311-12. In Barngrover, plaintiff filed in state court on a maritime negli-
gence action. [d. at 1309. He named two defendants and 20 Does. [d. The court ex-
plained that filing an At-Issue Memorandum is a prerequisite to placement on the "civil 
active list", a condition of being set for pretrial or trial. [d. at 1311. An essential part of 
an At-Issue Memorandum under California court rules is plaintiff's representation that 
all essential parties have been served or appeared, no other parties will be served, and no 
further pleadings will be filed. [d. Therefore, the court held, the filing of an At-Issue 
Memorandum, when no non-diverse Doe defendant has been served, is a "paper" trigger-
ing removability under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). [d. at 1312. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1942). In Haight plaintiff filed in state court naming rail-
road and employees, and Doe defendants. [d. at 902. She served and filed a memoran-
dum to set the cause for trial without having served the Does, although the statutory 
period had not elapsed. [d. When the case was called for trial plaintiff announced she 
was ready to go ahead; the court held this amounted to a voluntary severance of the Doe 
defendants. [d. 
234. 561 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
235. 659 F. Supp. 741 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
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served.iS8 Therefore the Memorandum did not sever plaintiff's 
claims against the Doe defendants and could not serve as a basis 
for removaVil37 However, since that plaintiff had failed to serve 
Does within the three year period mandated by Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc. Section 583.210,288 defendant was on constructive notice 
that he had thirty days to remove; his failure to do so caused 
him to lose the right.2S9 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b) requires defendant 
to petition for removal within thirty days after the existence of 
diversity jurisdiction is shown or lose his right to remove.240 The 
restrictive requirements of the Bryant "bright-line" rule regard-
ing when diversity is established, was fraught with peril for the 
unwary defendant who was liable to completely lose his right to 
removal. 241 
B. ALTERNATIVES 
1. Nominal Does and Doe Pleading Procedural 
The Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 man-
dates that the citizenship of fictitious defendants shall not im-
pair removal. Judge Kozinski in his dissent in Bryant explained 
the reasons for ignoring Doe defendants in diversity jurisdic-
tion.242 He argued that the Erie doctrine decrees that Doe plead-
ing be treated as procedural,243 He believed it is more realistic to 
treat Does as nominal parties, as in the "overwhelming major-
ity" of cases the Does are procedural fictions and impair removal 
for no reason.244 Therefore Does should be disregarded for diver-
236. [d. at 744. In Silverman, plaintiff filed in state court against a French citizen, a 
California corporation, and 10 Does. [d. at 742. Plaintiff filed an At-Issue Memorandum 
and then voluntarily dismissed the corporation; and the remaining named defendant 
filed for removal. [d. at 742. 
237. [d. at 744. 
238. See supra note 42 for text. 
239. [d. at 745. See supra note 51 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the removal 
statute. 
240. See supra note 51 for text. 
241. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98, 100 (1897), see supra 
note 54 and accompanying text for discussion (defendant must file at the earliest possi-
ble opportunity, that is, when the case first becomes removable). 
242. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 619-20, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
243. [d. at 617, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
244. [d. at 609, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
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sity purposes. 
Plaintiff can take the precaution of filing against Does alone 
in state court.2.11 If he later discovers a new party to sue, he can 
use the liberal Federal Rules of joinder and relation back.2.& If 
plaintiff is unable to join the new party, due to notice or timing 
problems, he may pursue parallel suits in state and federal 
courts. Removal must occur early in the case and be consistant 
nationwide as Congress intended. m 
The Bryant majority considered and rejected the Kozinski 
alternative. They concluded that carrying on parallel litigation 
in state court would be a duplication of effort.2•8 The majority 
worried about the plaintiff who discovers a diverse Doe defend-
ant after the federal 120 day time limit for service of process has 
expired2•9 (but before the statute of limitations has expired).2I10 
Since California has a three year period for service of process,2111 
plaintiff could petition for a remand to state court. If remand 
was allowed, then the diverse defendant could re-remove, result-
ing in a "ping-pong game".2112 It is, however, unclear how the di-
verse defendant could get back into Federal court where he was 
barred in the first place by his lack of notice under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(c)2113 and his untimely service under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 
4(j). 
If after removal, plaintiff amends his complaint to add a 
new nondiverse defendant within the statutory period, the Court 
Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 provides that the 
245. Plaintiff may file a complaint in state court naming Doe defendants only. See 
Hise v. Garlock, 841 F.2d 342, 343 (9th Cir. 1988). In Hise plaintiffs filed in an Idaho 
state court against 100 Doe defendants. [d. at 343. They amended the complaint to name 
three foreign corporations which removed to federal court on the basis of diversity juris-
diction. [d. The amended complaint retained the Doe defendants. [d. 
246. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 619-20, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
247. [d. at 619, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). The COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, § 909(b)(2)(b) Procedure for Removal amends 28 U.S.C. § 
1446 to the effect that a defendant may not remove more than one year after the com-
mencement of the action (see supra note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of 
removal). 
248. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.8. 
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j), see supra note 88 for text. 
250. Bryant, 844 F.2d. at 606 n.8. 
251. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.210, see supra note 42 for text. 
252. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.8. 
253. See supra note 95 for text. 
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court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand to the 
state court.2114 When Ford removed to federal court the only par-
ties were Ford, Bryant, and the unidentified Doe defendants. If 
the Does were treated as nominal parties, then complete diver-
sity existed. Under Judge Kozinski's plan, Bryant could have 
filed against the Does alone in state court, which would have 
given him three years to discover their identities. This allows 
removal early in the litigation, keeps removal rules consistent 
nationwide, and also allows plaintiff the benefit of the state Doe 
pleading practice. 
The Court Reform And Access to Justice Act of 1988 en-
dorsed Judge Kozinski's dissenting proposal. 
2. Does Nominal, but Doe Pleading Substantive 
Another alternative would have been to treat Does as proce-
dural fictions, assuming their reality only when they have been 
served with process. If served, they are real parties with ficti-
tious names. Then defendant can easily determine whether a 
Doe has been served and whether he can remove. The plaintiff 
would, however, retain his right to substitute Does for the three 
years allowed under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 583.210.21111 This 
is an alternative proposed by Stephen Easton in "Doe Defend-
ants and Other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diver-
sity Cases"2116 
The rationale is realism. Most Does are added simply to 
preserve plaintiff's right to add new defendants. When Bryant 
filed his complaint against Ford and 50 Does, he did not know 
who was really liable. He did eventually find three other defend-
ants, leaving 47 phantoms still attached to his complaint.21i7 It is 
254. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988 amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 
see supra note 52 for text. It permits remand if plaintiff seeks to join a diversity-destroy-
ing defendant after removal has occurred. "Joinder coupled with remand may be more 
attractive than either dismissal under civil rule 19(b) or denial of joinder .... This provi-
sion also helps to identify the consequences that may follow removal of a case with un-
identified fictitious defendants." COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, 
H.R. REPT. 100-889, 100th Congr. 2d Sess., Legislative History, supra note 2, § 1009 at 
72-73. 
255. See supra note 42 for text. 
256. Note, Doe Defendants, see supra note 33, at 320. 
257. Bryant, 832 F.2d at 1081. See also Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Nickel, 141 F. Supp. 41 
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important to distinguish between fictitiously-named defendants, 
who remain to be discovered (eg. the manufacturer of the defec-
tive seatbelt), and fictitious defendants, who are attached to the 
complaint so that plaintiff can bring in a new defendant if he 
can find one.2118 
Easton believes that Doe pleading is a substantive state 
right.2119 The California statute of limitations is unusually 
short,280 and federal courts apply the substantive statute of limi-
tations.281 Therefore he concludes that plaintiffs need the Doe 
pleading device to give them enough time to discover the real 
tortfeasors. The courts should have a policy of favoring resolu-
tion of a case on the merits over defendant's repose.282 
This proposal would increase defendants' access to the fed-
eral courts. Unfortunately, it would not speed removal since 
Pullman288 held that the mere failure to serve a fictitious de-
fendant is inadequate to establish diversity jurisdiction.284 
Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 583.210 plaintiff has the 
right to serve defendants for three years.2811 The Ninth Circuit, 
(C.D. Cal. 1956) (plaintiff alleged the involvement of 2000 Does). 
258. See Hogan, supra note 33 at 58-60, Note, Doe Defendants, supra notes 33, at 
319-320. 
259. Note, Doe Defendants, supra note 33, at 313, 317. 
260. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
261. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) see supra note 103 and accom-
panying text for discussion. 
262. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, see supra note 
49, § 4509 at 159, (1982): 
[d. at 159. 
It is difficult to imagine that there is any purpose underlying 
Rule 15(c) to raise a limitations bar that is not supported by 
the underlying state rule. The federal courts probably have no 
particular interest in avoiding stale diversity litigation-they 
would accept and apply a longer limitations period if the state 
had created one to govern all cases. Similarly, there is no ap-
parent reason why the federal courts should be more con-
cerned than state courts with the new defendant's sense of re-
pose. Application of the Federal Rule is very likely to cut off 
the plaintiff's right completely. 
263. 305 U.S. 534 (1939), see supra note 62 for discussion. 
264. [d. at 541. 
265. Subdivision (a) provides that "The summons and complaint shall be served 
upon a defendant within the three years after the action is commenced against the de-
fendant. For the purpose of this subdivision an action is commenced at the time the 
complaint is filed." Subdivision (d) provides that the three-year period does not run if 
service was "impossible, impracticable, or futile due to causes beyond the plaintiff's con-
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moreover, has rejected the idea that removability is triggered by 
failure to serve Doe defendants, requiring in addition plaintiff's 
voluntary dismissal of the Does.266 
3. Length of the California Statute of Limitations 
The California statute of limitations is unusually short.267 If 
the law were brought into conformity with that of other states, 
the Doe pleading device could be abolished, allowing a relation 
back rule similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).268 This obliterates the 
problem of determination of the citizenship of Doe defendants 
for removal purposes. This solution would have to come from 
the legislature.269 Congress has chosen to amend the removal 
trol. Failure to discover relevant facts or evidence is not a cause beyond the plaintiff's 
control for the purpose of this subdivision." See also, Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co., 39 
Cal.3d 146, 702 P.2d 563, 216 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985). In Barrington plaintiff substituted 
the named defendant for a Doe, but failed to serve process until after the expiration of 
the three year period. [d. at 149, 702 P.2d at 406, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 564. The court held 
that where the cause of action arises under the same operative facts, plaintiff has three 
years, and three years only to serve defendant. [d. at 154, 702 P. 2d at 568, 216 Cal. Rptr. 
at 410. 
266. Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1969) (The 
court held that the citizenship of a a non-diverse defendant could not be ignored just 
because he was unserved.) C/. Holloway v. Pacific Indem. Co., 422 F. Supp. 1036, 1041 
(D.C. Mich 1976) see supra note 201 for discussion. (A case is not removable until plain-
tiff either dismisses his action against a Doe defendant, or begins trial without having 
served him.) 
The Supreme Court, in Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986), see supra 
note 96 for discussion, rejected the idea of extending statute of limitations via the service 
of process. 
[d. at 2385. 
We are not inclined, either, to temper the plain meaning of 
the language (of Federal Rule 15(c» by engrafting upon it an 
extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted rea-
sonable time, inferred from Rule 4 for the service of a timely 
filed complaint. Rule 4 deals only with process. Rule 3 con-
cerns the 'commencement' of a civil action. Under Rule 15(c), 
the emphasis is upon 'the period provided by law for com-
mencing the action against' the defendant. An action is com-
menced by the filing of a complaint .... 
267. See supra note 39. 
268. See supra note 95 for text. 
269. Hogan, supra note 33, at 114-116. Hogan writes: 
This Article has suggested that California's Doe defend-
ant practice may be a reaction by bench and bar to Califor-
nia's unusually short statutes of limitations for personal injury 
and wrongful death action. For all its shortcomings, the prac-
tice does allow plaintiffs much needed additional time in 
which to ascertain potential defendants. Yet at the same time 
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statute instead of waiting for the California legislature to act. 
4. Return to Finality Rationale of the Voluntary-Involuntary 
Rule 
Another way of speeding along defendant's statutory right 
to removal would have been to allow diversity jurisdiction to be 
established by a final state court dismissal of a non-diverse de-
fendant. At present the voluntary-involuntary rule mandates 
that even a final state court dismissal of a party cannot serve as 
the basis of diversity jurisidiction.270 But the rule's formalistic 
requirements ignore the reason behind the rule. Judge Ely, in 
the dissenting opinion in Self71 said, "A plaintiff's unext-
inguished right of appeal, together with possible duplication of 
proceedings, have been identified repeatedly by legal commenta-
tors as the underlying basis for the decisions in these cases. "272 
After all, once the state court has finally dismissed a party, he 
cannot reappear and destroy diversity. If the state court could 
pierce the pleadings and dismiss Does when they are clearly pro-
cedural, fictitious, or sham, and the voluntary-involuntary rule 
allowed that dismissal to serve as a basis for removal, removal 
could occur at an earlier point in the litigation. 
The problems presented by the efforts to pierce the plead-
ings led to the attempted reform by the Bryant court. The Court 
Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 bypassed both the old 
problems, and the new ones created by Bryant, and left the vol-
untary-involuntary rule intact. 
[d. at 114. 
the very existence of the practice may have inhibited any leg-
islative effort to revise these statutes of limitations. If the leg-
islature were to notice that the vast majority of states allow 
double or triple the time for filing personal injury actions as 
does California it might conclude that California's statute is 
far too stingy. If the legislature lengthened the statutes of lim-
itations to 2 or 3 years, the Doe defendant practice would be 
much less defensible, for once the limitations period becomes 
a fair and realistic one, the sound policy considerations under-
lying the very creation of statues of limitations reassert 
themselves. 
270. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
271. Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J. dissenting), 
see supra note 59 and accompanying text for discussion. 
272. [d. at 662. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The previous rule regarding removal of cases in which ficti-
tious defendants were named was riddled with confusion and in-
consistency. The Bryant court attempted to make a new "bright 
line" rule which reduced the federal court workload, while pre-
serving the rights of California plaintiffs. Unfortunately, the 
Bryant rule created more problems than it solved. The new fed-
eral statute has the benefits of simplicity and completeness, con-
sistency and clarity. No longer will Doe pleading and removal 
remain "shrouded in mystery and confusion".273 
Susan E. Foe* 
273. Goldberg v. CPC Intern., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1980), see supra 
note 170 for discussion. 
·Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990. 
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